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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Asymmetric threats and their challenges to freedom of 
navigation 
 
Degree:  Master of Science. 
 
Asymmetric threats in the maritime domain are a lurking danger that can rear its 
head when least expected, to unleash death and destruction to life and property.  
While the September 11 attacks against the twin towers and other US targets were 
not maritime terrorist incidents, these incidents nonetheless completely transformed 
the shipping and port industries’ outlook towards security. Ports and harbours which 
were once tourist places of interest were literally converted to fortresses with armed 
guards, barbed wire fences and CCTV network. Access to ships and ports became 
restricted and heavily regulated, drills and security exercises became the norm thanks 
to the ISPS Code. Soon many security initiatives were launched, including some 
notable US led programmes such as CSI, PSI and CT-PAT to try to mitigate the risks 
in the maritime domain. Some of these initiatives especially SUA 2005 and PSI have 
the tendency to challenge the traditional right of freedom of navigation. This research 
analyses the asymmetric threats in the maritime domain and how they would affect 
the present day concept of freedom of navigation with the possibility of its 
derogation by states, through security initiatives and phenomenon of creeping 
jurisdiction, when faced with maritime terror and other violent attacks.  
 
KEYWORDS: Asymmetric Threats, Asymmetric Warfare, Freedom of 
Navigation, Maritime Domain Awareness, SUA, PSI, WMD, 
UNCLOS. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
Shipping, since the time mankind first sailed the oceans, has evolved from the deep 
rooted tradition of freedom of the seas, of which freedom of navigation is one aspect. 
The concept of freedom of navigation has undergone frequent transformations as per 
the dictates of time and the practice of states.  After the codification of customary 
laws of the sea under the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1982), 
the concept of freedom of navigation was preserved albeit via innocent passage 
through territorial sea, transit passage through international straits and flag state 
jurisdiction on the high seas.  Thus the concept of freedom of navigation of the 
Grotian era was replaced by a structured and more regulated regime through 
UNCLOS.  This shift towards a more regulated maritime domain came about mostly 
due to growing technological advancement in management of ocean resources 
coupled with growing concerns for safety of human life and the marine environment.  
Environmental issues dominated the maritime domain until 9/11.  
 
The September 11 attacks acted as a catalyst to signify the dangers posed by 
asymmetric threats to shipping.   The attacks on USS Cole and MT Limburg exposed 
the vulnerability of maritime targets to asymmetric attacks.  The importance of the 
shipping industry is paramount for sustenance of the global economy.  The rapid 
pace of globalisation in the recent past has seen growth in trade and commerce rise 
drastically, 90% of which is attributed to shipping.  The merchant shipping industry 
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world over has more than 50,000 ships and this number increases by approximately 
3000-3300 ships annually at an approximate rate of 6.7% (UNCTAD 2009).  These 
rising volumes of trade and shipping, crisscrossing the oceans, have posed a 
tremendous challenge to law enforcement agencies all over the world. According to 
Rand Corporation analyst Peter Chalk (2009, p.127) “the maritime environment will 
likely remain a favourable theatre for armed violence, crime and terrorism given its 
expanse, lack of regulation and general importance as a critical conduit for 
international trade”.   Asymmetric threats in the maritime domain arise mostly from 
non state actors who can use ships as floating bombs to destroy ports and other 
maritime infrastructure. The navigational freedoms arising out of flag state 
jurisdiction are now being considered an obstacle in the war against terror and other 
security issues.  As a result of which interferences on the high seas have, within 
recent years, become quite common.  Interferences though can lead to greater 
security for navigation; however, at the same time, besides causing undue delay and 
economic loss to the ship owner, these are viewed as derogations to traditional 
freedom of navigation (Wendel, 2007). The challenge, therefore, for law 
enforcement agencies is to find the right balance. Interdiction and boarding at sea 
does affect navigational freedoms but these are also measures to deter perpetrators 
from wrong doing. Lack of policing and interdictions at sea might lead to 
lawlessness and insecurity especially when dealing with WMD proliferation which is 
detrimental to international peace and security.  This dissertation aims to analyse the 
aspects of asymmetric threats, consequences of terror attacks, maritime security 
initiatives and their impacts on freedom of navigation.  
 
1.2  Objectives 
This research intends to analyse the asymmetric threats in the maritime domain and 
their impact on the freedom of navigation.  The research thus intends to first discuss 
the concept of freedom of navigation and trace its transformation through the 
centuries.  Secondly, the research also intends to introduce the concept of asymmetry 
and discuss various asymmetric threats in the maritime domain, consequences of 
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possible terror attacks, modus operandi of maritime capable terror organisations and 
associated risks.  Although piracy and organised crime, which are committed for 
financial gains, also constitute the asymmetric threat dimension, the main focus of 
this research will be on asymmetric threats from terrorism and insurgency both of 
which are politically motivated.   Finally the author intends to focus on the pros and 
cons of various maritime security initiatives and domain awareness tools, and the 
likely impact of terror attacks on the freedom of navigation due to various security 
initiatives and state practice related to security. 
 
1.3  Research Questions 
The following research questions need answers in order to reach a conclusion: 
1. What is the concept of freedom of navigation? 
2. How has the concept evolved through the years? 
3. What is asymmetry and what constitutes asymmetric threat in the maritime 
domain? 
4. What are the capabilities and modus operandii of various maritime terror 
organisations? 
5. How vulnerable is the maritime domain to asymmetric attack? 
6. What are the important maritime security initiatives and how do they counter 
asymmetric threats? 
7. What is maritime domain awareness and how does it counter asymmetric 
threats? 
8. What are the likely regulatory ramifications in the event of a terror attack and 
how will they impact on the freedom of navigation? 
 
1.4  Scope 
 The scope of this research will include discussions pertaining to the evolution of 
freedom of navigation through the years, asymmetric warfare, and asymmetric 
threats in the maritime domain, the various maritime security initiatives and how 
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they measure up against asymmetric threats. The scope of the research will also 
extend to analyses of vulnerability and attractiveness of maritime targets against 
asymmetric attacks, the concept of maritime domain awareness, its tools and its 
effectiveness and the impact of terror attacks on freedom of navigation due to 
regulatory Conventions, state practice and security initiatives.  
 
1.5  Research method 
The principle research method applied in this study is qualitative analysis.  This was 
undertaken mainly by collating the information available from a literature search. 
The details on the history of freedom of navigation are researched from well 
publicised history books, journals and encyclopaedia.  The literature on asymmetric 
concepts and warfare is mainly obtained from military journals, doctrines and 
unclassified reports as the concepts have evolved mainly from military doctrines. 
The research also gathers information on piracy and security related information 
from the IMB, analyses documents released by various terrorism and security 
databases like Rand Corporation, published government reports and military thesis. 
Aspects of creeping jurisdiction, erosion of freedom of navigation and compliance 
with laws of the sea in letter and spirit by state parties to UNCLOS are explored 
through journals and books. Further the aspects of maritime domain awareness and 
security initiatives and their influence on freedom of navigation are explored through 
relevant literature and internet research. 
 
1.6  Organization  
This dissertation is organised into six chapters.  Chapter One, which is the present 
chapter offers an introduction to the research topic, establishes the objectives, 
research questions and mentions the scope of the research work and the methodology 
adopted.   Chapter Two will discuss the origin of the freedom of navigation and trace 
its development, trends and relevance through the years.  Chapter Three will 
introduce the concept of asymmetric warfare and discuss the various threats to 
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maritime security.  This will be followed by Chapter Four which will focus on 
maritime asymmetric attacks, organizations and capabilities of various terror 
networks, and discuss the possibility of a nexus between terrorists and pirates. 
Chapter Five will analyse the various threat countermeasures and the challenges they 
pose to navigational freedoms and finally Chapter Six will conclude with a 
discussion of the challenges to navigational freedoms through state practice and 
security initiatives by generating hypothetical situations and  offer some conclusions 
in that regard.  
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Chapter 2 
Freedom of navigation – Its origin, trends and relevance 
 
2.1  Background 
Archaeological evidence shows that man sailed oceans far earlier than he started to 
move the distance on land (Wilford, 2010).   Some authors have even remarked that 
there were sailors before there were farmers and shepherds to prove that seafaring 
has been a vital part of human history (Bass, 1972; Gold, 1981).  History is also 
witness to the Egyptian invention of sails some 8000 years ago to power ships to ply 
the oceans (IMO, 1998).  Subsequent sophistication in the design of sail and ship 
increased the speed, distance and carrying capacity thus helping to establish trade 
link between states.  Seaborne trade has been associated with many past civilizations 
like that between Indus and Sumerian in the third and second millennium B.C., 
followed by Phoenicians, Judeans and Greeks, all successively becoming principle 
seafaring states in the later years.  
 
It is strongly believed that flourishing trade evolved under the basis of international 
custom and the regulations governing it.  There were even steps to codify these 
customs into laws. Hammurabi’s codes did address the maritime segment; however, 
it is the Phoenicians who are credited with the first sea law (Lobingier as cited in 
Gold, 1981).  The fading away of Phoenician domination tilted the balance of 
maritime supremacy in favour of the Greeks in the Mediterranean region who 
established courts to deal with maritime matters (Gold, 1981).   In India, the codes of 
Manu enriched commercial aspects of law around the same time of the Greek 
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domination.  The Rhodians appeared on the scene towards the latter half of the 
period of Greek domination with their own set of laws that, according to some 
writers,1 provided the basis for Roman laws.  However, there are differing opinions 
on the matter.  Roman law as it evolved through the compilation and codification of 
customary practices and judgments incorporated doctrinal aspects which prevail even 
to this day (Mukherjee, 2002).  
 
Roman law, contained rules that regarded seas as naturali iure communia omnium 
(common to all by natural law); however, with respect to the Mediterranean, it 
followed a double standard on the pretext of self determined obligation for 
preserving law and order (Vitzthum, 2002).  The state practice in those times namely 
by Rome, Venice and Rhodes  was to exercise rights over maritime zones in order to 
preserve law and order against pirates who were considered as communis hostis 
omnium (common enemy of all)(Vitzthum, 2002).   
 
The decline of the Roman Empire in the beginning of the age of discovery saw the 
emergence of new independent states in Europe.  This was also the period in which 
the race for dominance in sea power commenced with Spain and Portugal leading the 
pack, closely followed by the Dutch and the English.  The “seas common to all” 
concept that developed under Roman law was pushed to the backburner in 1493 
when under Papal bull and under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the sea was apportioned 
between Spain and Portugal thus allowing these two states exclusive rights related to 
navigation in their respective domains (Anand, 1973). 
 
                                                 
1 Selden, Azuni and Lobinger support the view that the Roman codes evolved out of Rhodian law 
whereas writers like Bynkershoek, Benedict, Gilmore and Black strongly oppose the view. 
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2.2  Freedom of navigation, genesis and development 
The following section will discuss the genesis of the concept of freedom of 
navigation and how it was used, abused or transformed depending upon the dictates 
of time, space and state practice during the subsequent years since its genesis. 
 
2.2.1  Period 1600-1800 
The Spanish and Portuguese domination and control of the seas and Dutch initiatives 
to break this monopoly brought Grotius on to the scene as an advocate for the Dutch 
East India Company to propound his doctrine on freedom of the seas through his 
thesis in Mare Liberum or The Free Seas published in 1609.  There is universal 
agreement that Grotius was the first to proclaim the freedom of the seas doctrine 
even though the same was declared a binding principle in Roman law (Anand, 1973). 
However, with the fall of the Roman Empire the doctrine had also been forgotten. 
The origin of the doctrine is debatable and a matter of opinion because while modern 
international law writers believe without doubt that the concept of the freedom of 
seas evolved in Europe based on European beliefs and customary practice (Vitzthum, 
2002), there are also those like Anand who advocate that the concept was already 
well recognized by customary law in Asia and codified and well publicized in the 
maritime codes of Maccasar and Malacca, which were compiled in the thirteen 
century A.D.  
 
Further, the rules of maritime law and the freedom of navigation practiced by Asian 
states and explained and recommended in a European context by Grotius were not 
immediately acceptable to European states, which were at war with each other in 
their bid to vie for the Asian spice trade (Anand, 2002).  The freedom of navigation 
became a casualty in Europe following the apportionment of the seas not only 
between Spain and Portugal but also due to claims by Venice over the Adriatic Sea, 
English domination of the North Sea and Denmark’s closure of the Sound to virtually 
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block movement to the Baltic, all this while the tradition of navigational freedom 
continued in Asia (Fulton, 1911).  
 
The struggle for dominance at sea witnessed many battles and, following the Dutch 
victory over the Portuguese, even Grotius, who advocated Mare Liberum, shed his 
theory of freedom of seas doctrine to support the Dutch monopoly of trade against 
the English.   In the famous battle of books Mare Liberum vs Mare Clausum (closed 
seas) propounded by John Selden, which was an exception to the free seas doctrine, 
the victor apparently was Mare Clausum due to states practice of consolidation of sea 
domination (Mukherjee, 2002). Freedom of navigation during this period was 
conveniently forgotten in support of trade interests in the East Indies (Zemanek, 
1999).  The period also saw the development of the concept of territorial waters, 
perhaps as a result of incessant battles, along with protection of sea ports and coastal 
towns, and brought to prominence the canon shot rule2 (three mile rule)(Schaffer, 
1997). 
 
2.2.2  Period 1800-1900 
The realization of the importance of the concept of freedom of navigation dawned 
only two hundred years later in response to the needs of the European industrial 
powers for wider markets in Asia and Africa, as it was more useful to advocate open 
and free seas in order to exploit vast unexplored areas of the world which no nation 
could reach alone. The rapid advancement in technology, communication and 
infrastructure, including shipping, resulted in the creation of more demands in 
industrialized Western nations for raw materials, labour and access to markets for 
                                                 
2 "Cannon Shot" doctrine. This doctrine holds that a coastal State enjoys sovereignty over the waters 
adjacent to its coastline as far seawards as the range of a cannon ball. Also known by its French name, 
portée du canon, this rule was favoured from 1610 until 1911 and reached its zenith during the period 
1702 to 1793 available at http://cdserver2.ru.ac.za/cd/011120_1/Aqua/Marine%20Fisheries/ CHAP2/ 
CANON.HTM.  
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dumping surplus (Anand, 1973). Colonization of small or weaker nations was the 
name of the game.  Following the defeat of Napoleon, Great Britain emerged 
stronger and was a leading nation in ocean commerce (McDowell & Gibbs, 
1954/1999).   The principle of freedom of the seas was actively practiced not only to 
allow free movement of merchant ships across the oceans in pursuit of trade and but 
also to advance military might to subjugate and colonize other people.  The political 
climate in Europe allowed many nations like Germany, Italy, France and Netherlands 
to catch up with Britain.  The United States also commenced the development of its 
shipping industry for greater access to markets (Fayle, 1933/2006).  Japan also 
advanced, albeit late, but had considerably increased its influence after its war with 
China.  This was also the time when sail ships were being replaced by larger and 
more powerful steam ships.  
 
The period also witnessed the first international conference by maritime states in 
1889 to discuss regulations on collision, vessel safety, uniformity in navigational 
marks and dangers and information sharing on weather (Stearns & Langer, 2001). 
The period from 1800 to 1900 witnessed unprecedented advancement in scientific, 
technical and commercial expertise related to oceans and also a sixteen fold increase 
in the world’s import export trade over the previous century (Gold, 1981, p. 131).  
The free seas doctrine championed by Britain had by the end of the 19th century 
obtained universal approval through state practice (Butler & Maccoby, 2003). 
 
2.2.3  Period 1900-1945 
This period was the most chaotic in the modern era.  The two world wars caused 
death and destruction to life and property all over the world and changed global 
power dimensions.  The rivalry for world power carried along with an apocalyptic 
race for colonies and overseas markets, contributing largely to the outbreak of the 
First World War.  A destructive prestige oriented ideology set the major powers on a 
collision course (Gold, 1981).  The sea battles fought during World War I completely 
annihilated the freedoms of navigation and challenged the principles of international 
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law.  The declaration of extended military zones, laying of mine fields and economic 
blockade by the British saw Germany unleash its submarine power against shipping 
of all kinds including merchant ships.  The effectiveness of German submarine 
warfare, which wreaked havoc on the Royal Navy, sowed the seeds of a new 
dimension in the annals of the history of naval warfare, the beginning of submarine 
warfare (Heyman, 1997).  The period between the First and Second World Wars 
witnessed greater involvement of governments in marine transport regulation and 
formulation of maritime policy in furtherance of political ambition.  This interim 
period of peace was also a witness to the post war formation of the League of 
Nations and its dramatic collapse following the outbreak of the Second World War.  
 
The League of Nations during its short existence adopted an agenda for discussions 
related to territorial water limits and a contiguous zone (Gold, 1981).  During the 
intervening period between the two wars, the concept of freedom of seas existed in 
relatively uneasy peace but was far from an established principle of international law. 
This was so aptly true since seeds for the Second World War were already sown by 
the Treaty of Versailles and its inequality of disarmament principles (Gordon, 1999). 
The sea battles witnessed daring actions of German u-boats against both naval and 
commercial targets3. As in the previous war, the freedom of the seas was left to the 
mercy of the belligerents as commercial ships were targeted by both sides for 
strategic gains.  The immediate post war results were dramatic.  The Soviet Union 
and United States were favourably placed for becoming super powers, some new 
nations were formed, and many nations found new independence after being 
liberated from colonial rule (Stevens & Westcott, 1944).  
 
                                                 
3 See Sinking of Athenia and Royal Oak available at  http://www.uboataces.com/battle-athenia.shtml  
and http://www.uboataces.com/battle-scapa-flow6.shtml respectively. 
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2.2.4  Period 1945-1967 
Towards the end of the Second World War and due to the failure of the League of 
Nations, the United Nations was born.  The UN became an international forum for 
the Third World, or the developing nations, wherein these countries could voice their 
opinions and had scope for concerted action against big powers.  The rivalry of the 
US and the erstwhile USSR engulfed the world on the brink of a Cold War. Nations 
rising from the aftermath of the Second World War continued their development 
aspirations, with new technology, scientific inquiry and space and ocean studies 
gathering momentum.  Oil and gas became precious resources and their discovery in 
the high seas (then beyond 3nm) and its economic viability coupled with new 
trawling and fish finding techniques encouraged the technologically advanced 
nations to cash in on these resources.  Japan and Russia (then USSR) developed their 
long distance fishing fleets including fish factory ships to process and preserve fish 
to increase their reach to distant fishing grounds especially off the coastal areas of 
Africa and Asia.  The coastal states and especially the Latin American countries were 
alarmed by this intrusion (Anand, 1983).  Following the Truman proclamation4, three 
Latin American countries taking their cue from this proclamation, and with the aim 
of protecting their fisheries, came out with the Santiago declaration (UN Treaty 
series 14758, 1952)5 in 1952 to claim exclusive jurisdiction up to 200 nm. 
 
 In 1948, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation or IMCO (now 
known as IMO) was formed to look into the aspects of ship safety and regulation of 
maritime transportation.  International law development also started to take wings 
with the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960. The 
outcome of both conferences was a failure; however, Art. 2 of the Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 recognized the regime of the high seas and the 
                                                 
4 See the text of President Harry Truman‘s proclamation available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ 
policy/1945/450928a.html. 
5 Santiago Declaration by Peru, Ecuador and Chile and later by Costa Rica available at http://untreaty 
.un.org/unts/1_60000/28/18/00054896.pdf 
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freedoms governing the same including the freedom of navigation, fishing, over 
flight and laying of submarine cables.  This was an important milestone in the history 
of international law as, for the first time, the freedom of the seas was codified 
(Oxman, 2006).  Contrary to the euphoria following the milestone in the developed 
world, the aspect was seen with sceptism by most of the developing countries as it 
was the considered opinion of many of the newly independent nations that this legal 
freedom would allow developed nations to exploit their resources unflinchingly 
(Dean, 1958).  Countries affected by Japan’s long distance fishing fleets argued for 
extension of territorial waters from the then existing 3nm canon shot limit. The 1958 
and 1960 conferences failed to decide on the limits of territorial waters (Churchill & 
Lowe, 1999).  By the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the freedom of seas had lost 
its character as it became beneficial to the selected few that had the technology and 
capacity.  The developing countries no longer considered the high seas freedom as 
freedom in the true sense; according to them, this concept had been wrongly 
interpreted by dominant naval powers to move across the open seas to threaten 
smaller states or use the concept as a convenience for subjugation and colonization 
(Stevens & Westcott, 1944).  Many small nations were concerned that the concept of 
freedom of the seas had been transformed by the developed world as a license to 
overfish and pollute, in addition to gaining unrestricted access to other state’s coastal 
areas.  
 
2.2.5 Period 1967-1982 
The year 1967 was an eventful year in the history of the law of the sea, first came the 
Torrey Canyon disaster which shook the world from its deep slumber on the impact 
of ship source oil pollution. The next was the Pardo Declaration.  The Maltese 
ambassador Mr. Arvid Pardo’s declaration to replace the concept of freedom of high 
seas with the principle of common heritage of mankind set the ball rolling for the 
formation of a sea bed committee to examine the legal regime of the deep sea bed 
(Baslar, 1998).  This formation of a Sea Bed Authority set the foundations for the 
third UNCLOS, which held its first session in 1973.  The conference was divided 
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into three committees each with a different agenda, thus there was a sea bed 
committee, maritime zones committee, which looked into territorial waters, 
contiguous zone, EEZ and the high seas, and a third committee which had the 
environment and scientific research as agenda items. During the negotiations a clear 
divide between developed nations that favoured freedom of navigation and 
developing nations that argued for extension of coastal state rights to end the laissez-
faire regime on the high seas was very apparent.  
 
The Third world countries (G-776) stood together for regulation of freedom of seas 
doctrine and argued for more balance in order to safeguard their security and 
sovereignty interests.  In 1982, when the conferences concluded the law of the seas 
had finally been codified. The end result was based on equity. The developing 
nations were able to extend their coastal state jurisdiction to 200 nm from their 
baselines with the establishment of the EEZ and the developed nations, due to 
incorporation of high seas rights in the EEZ clause, could also enjoy their freedom of 
navigation in these zones.  Fishing freedom, which was prevalent in the past, was 
curtailed as a result of the third UNCLOS. The convention was open for signature for 
a period of two years at the end of which 159 states and the European Commission 
had become signatories (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). 
 
2.2.6 Post UNCLOS 82 
The practice of the freedom of the seas concept post UNCLOS 82 has generally been 
governed by the coastal state laws which in turn are broadly based on a state’s 
interpretation of the international laws governing that domain. Under UNCLOS 82, 
the seas were divided into zones under varying degrees of coastal state control 
regime based on the distance of the area from the baseline as shown in Figure 1. This 
approach reflected the balance between the competing interests of coastal states and 
user states, which was the central issue of UNCLOS. The equitable distribution 
                                                 
6 See Group of 77 available at http://www.g77.org/doc on G-77 which is the largest intergovernmental 
organization of developing states in the U.N. 
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envisaged an undisturbed seaborne trade and legal order to promote peaceful uses of 
seas and oceans since the total area of the EEZ of all the coastal states covered most 
of the routes used for international navigation (Kwiatkowska, 1989). 
 
As regards the freedom of navigation through waters within the national jurisdiction 
of a coastal state, UNCLOS recognizes three kinds of rights of passage, namely 
innocent, transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage. All ships enjoy the right of 
innocent passage through territorial waters as long as the passage is expeditious and 
continuous and innocent within the meaning of the Convention. 
 
 
Figure 17 - Maritime Zones and Coastal State Jurisdiction 
 
 The coastal state has due jurisdiction to apply its laws and rules in relation to 
innocent passages; however, such laws and regulations, according to the Convention, 
should not hamper the freedom of navigation except in specified areas of 
                                                 
7 Source : Kumar,B.V(2007). Oceans and the Regulatory Framework: A techno-legal perspective. 
http://drs.nio.org/drs/bitstream/2264/780/2/Refresher_Course_Mar_Geol_Geophys_2007_Lecture_No
tes_14.pdf 
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archipelagic waters wherein a state can temporarily suspend innocent passage if the 
same is detrimental to its national security (Kwiatkowska,  1989).  
 
Transit passage is the exercise of freedom of navigation solely for expeditious and 
continuous transit of straits that may lie between one area of the high seas or an EEZ 
and another area of the high seas or EEZ. Ships and aircraft exercising transit 
passage, however, have an obligation to refrain from any threat of use of force 
against the riparian state bordering such a strait (Agoes, 2000).  The archipelagic sea 
lanes passage is a new concept in international law and is sui generis in nature 
wherein the waters are neither internal waters nor territorial sea, and hence 
sovereignty issues related to coastal states are subject to other rights enjoyed by third 
states. 
 
Freedom of navigation as envisaged in UNCLOS 82 imposes no restriction on any 
vessel, except that it should not be engaged in piracy, slave trading, research, 
resource exploration or exploitation within the juridical waters of the coastal state 
without that coastal state’s permission (Guy, 2005).  Foreign warships enjoy the 
same freedom of navigation as merchant vessels and may conduct naval manoeuvres 
within the EEZ of any other state provided that such manoeuvres are not detrimental 
to the interests of the coastal state and the international community.  States can lay 
pipelines, submarine cables and enjoy other uses of the sea within an EEZ, provided 
that they have due regard for the rights, laws and regulations of the coastal state and 
for freedom of navigation.  
 
In practice, however, coastal states tend to interfere in the freedom of navigation 
sometimes in contravention of UNCLOS, based on threats posed either due to 
pollution or security or sometimes even both.  Table 1 shows restrictions imposed by 
certain states on the freedom of navigation.   Recent incidents mentioned in Table 2 
have arisen because of the defensive attitude of the coastal state with respect to its 
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security and sovereignty against the freedom of navigation exercised by big powers 
(Valencia & Akimoto, 2006).   
 
Post 9/11 with the advent of the ISPS Code, security issues have come to the fore.  
Somali piracy has also resulted in a severe erosion of the freedom of navigation 
wherein ships are no longer free to move as was possible two decades ago in those 
waters.  Thus, the doctrine has faced challenges since its inception; however, it has 
survived this long in one form or another. 
 
 
Table 1-Claims concerning freedom of navigation8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Source: Kopella, S. (2009, April). The territorialisation of the exclusive economic zone: implications 
for maritime jurisdiction. Paper presented at the international boundary research unit. Twentieth 
anniversary conference 2009.  The state of sovereignty, Durham University. U.K. 
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Table 2-Recent list of security related major incidents9
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The history of the law of the sea has witnessed battles, struggles and incidents 
between states in favour of and against the exercise of freedom of navigation.  The 
concept continued to be used, abused and transformed as time went by until its 
codification.  Freedom of navigation allowed trade and cultural exchange in the past, 
though colonisation and subjugation also took place in parallel.  Prior to UNCLOS, 
freedom of navigation meant a laissez-faire license to pollute and overfish that 
eventually had to be regulated in order to sustain the ocean environment, peace and 
security of the world.  According to Djalal (2009), the old freedom of navigation is 
an outdated concept as the oceans are being regulated to a greater extent now more 
than was done in the past, especially post UNCLOS.  Security and environmental 
threats have come in the way of the doctrine of mare liberum.  International 
conventions10 and the designation of special areas have to a large extent regulated the 
past laissez-faire regime with respect to environmental concerns.   Security issues, 
except in some few instances, did not largely interfere with the freedom of 
navigation until the ISPS regime came about in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  
                                                 
9Source: Valencia, M.J and Akimoto, K (2006). Guidelines for navigation and overflight in the 
Exclusive economic zone, Marine Policy 30, 704-711. 
10 MARPOL, Dumping,  Anti fouling, Ballast Water management, Basel, Ship recycling,  OPRC and 
HNS. 
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The freedom of navigation has always faced challenges since its genesis.  
Nevertheless, it has managed to survive the long process of transformation and 
moulding through the passage of time. 
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Chapter 3 
Concept of asymmetrical warfare, threats and maritime security 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In 1979 when Fredrick Forsyth published his novel “Devil’s alternative” which 
described a terrorist threat to blow up a hijacked ultra large crude carrier carrying 
approximately one million tones of crude off the North Sea, if the terrorists’ demands 
were not met, he was perhaps hinting at the most dynamic and yet elusive threat of 
asymmetric warfare likely to be employed by a terror organization against a state or 
many states.  Fiction it was, but history is prudent to the fact that fictions of the past 
are the realities of the present as can be attributed to the Tom Clancy novels11  
foretelling a 9/11 incident back in the mid 90s.  Asymmetric threat as a concept was 
not coined after 9/11; however, it definitely came into prominence after that incident 
when the World realized the potential dimensions of this kind of threat and the havoc 
it could cause. 
  
3.2 Concept of asymmetric threats 
Webster dictionary defines asymmetry as “not symmetrical” or “incommensurable”.  
Asymmetric threats according to some military journals arise from threats of “not 
fighting fair” or attacking a weak point characterized as asymmetric warfare.  Late 
US President John .F. Kennedy while addressing the West Point graduating class 
brought out the essence of typical asymmetric warfare when he said:  
                                                 
11 Debt of Honor, (1994) and Executive decision (1996). 
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This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by 
guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by 
combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and 
exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . . It preys on economic 
unrest and ethnic conflicts…... (Buffalo, 2006, p.1). 
 
The important attributes of asymmetric threats can also be gleaned from Michael 
Rubin’s statement where, according to him, the asymmetric threats:   
 
……are not new, nor are strategists’ attentions to them. In every era, from 
the pre-modern to the present day, weak forces utilize surprise, technology, 
innovative tactics, or what some might consider violations of military 
etiquette to challenge the strong. (Rubin, 2007). 
 
3.3 Asymmetric warfare12
One can characterize asymmetric warfare as a concept which is different from 
traditional warfare chiefly because of its manifestation in many forms making it all 
the more elusive.  Traditional warfare is usually fought between nation states; 
however, asymmetric warfare can be carried out by non state actors.  Asymmetric 
warfare has many synonyms and related terms such as guerrilla warfare, irregular 
warfare, low intensity conflict, proxy war and fourth generation warfare.  Figure 2 
highlights the contrasting aims of asymmetric warfare vis a vis conventional warfare. 
 
                                                 
12See Appendix 1 for more definitions of asymmetric warfare. 
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Figure 2-Contrast between conventional and asymmetric warfare13
 
Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. has shown a greater interest in 
understanding and modifying its response to asymmetric warfare.  Figure 3 
represents the assumed operational risk from asymmetric threats arising from states 
like North Korea, China and Iran to the U.S.  It is obvious from the figure that the 
operational risks from such covert operations involve maximum lethality and hence 
the U.S. has oriented its defence forces to prepare for asymmetric warfare 
(Applegate, 2001).  
 
Notwithstanding the significant U.S. asymmetric threat related studies emanating 
from various state actors, contemporary writers generally include terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare, and WMD, cyber or information warfare, especially from non state actors as 
asymmetric threats (Blanck, 2003). 
 
 
                                                 
13 Source: U.S. Department of Defense (2007, September 11).  Irregular warfare, a U.S. Joint 
operations concept available at   http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf 
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Figure 3-Spectrum of conflict14
 
 
3.4 Spectrum of asymmetric threats in maritime domain 
World trade has grown consistently and over 90% of trade by volume is conducted 
through shipping (UNCTAD, 2009).  The demand for goods and resources in one 
corner of the globe and excess supply in the other has allowed exchange of trade. 
Foreign trade became the engine of economic growth after the Second World War 
following diminishing trade barriers and opening of markets. The increased 
globalization of trade and commerce also brought with it, slowly but surely, 
increased globalised threat dimensions taking forms hitherto unconceived. Shipping 
today faces threats which are asymmetrical in construct and tactics. Risk 
intelligence15 developed a four circles model (See Figure 4) for compartmentalizing 
                                                 
14Source:  Hoffman, F.G. (2009). Hybrid threats: reconceptualising the evolving character of modern 
conflicts. Strategic Forum, 240,1. 
15Risk Intelligence is a risk intelligence company consulting private and governmental clients on 
security threats and risks. Risk Intelligence has been specialising in analysing threats from and inter-
action between piracy, organised crime, terrorism, insurgency and military conflicts since 2003. 
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maritime security threats for better assessment.  The model (slightly modified by this 
author), according to Hansen (2009) reveals a trend whereby much of today’s 
maritime crime is carried out by organized crime syndicates and insurgency groups.  
Risk intelligence has used the Four circles model to characterize the various threats 
in the maritime domain viz terrorism, piracy, insurgency and organized crime. 
 
Figure 4-Four circles model16
3.4.1 Threats from terrorism 
Terrorism is the form of violence that most closely integrates one sided violence 
against civilians with asymmetrical violent confrontation against a stronger opponent 
be it a state or group of states. The ultimate aim is not the killing of innocent 
civilians per se but through the terror such a deed generates; it destabilizes national 
or international public security for political gains (Stepanova, 2008).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
  
16 Source: Hansen, H.T. (2009). .Distinctions in the finer shades of grey: The four circles model for 
maritime security assessment. In Rupert Herbert Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds).  Lloyds 
MIU handbook of maritime security (pp.73-83). London: CRC Press.  
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Figure 5-Worldwide terror incidents17 (1996-2006) 
 
 
The annual number of terrorist incidents from 1988-2006(Figure 5) has shown a 
steady increase with a particularly sharp rise from 2004-2006(mostly due to incidents 
in Iraq).  Terrorism, despite its global presence, has no universally accepted 
definition,18 possibly because of excessive politicization coupled with varying and 
diversified manifestations. However, since mass casualty (in terms of innocent 
civilians killed) is the primary source for attracting media attention, terrorists are 
mostly like to target non combatant or commercial buildings, infrastructure and 
public transportation.  Further, as the state or states are the ultimate recipient of the 
terrorist’s message, terrorists seek to employ the best possible way to wage a war 
against a state or states by resorting to the asymmetric nature of terrorism.  The 
                                                 
17 Source: Stepanova, E. (2008). Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural 
Aspects. SIPRI research report # 23. Stockholm: Oxford University Press. 
18 See Eye on the UN (2010).  U.N. has no definition of terrorism, where it is mentioned that UN has 
so far not been able to give definition of terrorism  available at http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts .asp 
?1=1&p=61 
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terrorists use asymmetric attacks against civilian targets as a force multiplier to 
compensate for their lack of military power against a state or group of states. 
 
Maritime shipping and infrastructure, being one of the sources of a nation’s 
commercial interest, also qualifies as a potential target of interest for terrorists. 
Terror attacks against maritime targets in the past have been quite diverse. 
Perpetrators of past incidents carried out attacks with differing motives. Some 
targeted cruise ships (Santa Maria, Achille Lauro, City of Poros, Our Lady of 
Mediatrix and Super Ferry) and merchant ships (Coral Sea, Vory  Limburg and Sri 
Lankan tanker19  and Cargo vessel Ruhana and Nimalawa) while others attacked 
military vessels (USS Cole, USS Ashland, Lankan Navy Dvora class Fast Attack 
Craft )(Hansen, 2009).   
 
Maritime targets in comparison with terrestrial targets have been less attractive to 
terrorists in the past. This could be due to the complexity and capability that is 
required to carry out such an attack and the fact that impacts (publicity and media 
attention) from such attacks yield less mileage as compared to terrestrial ones. 
Statistics also bear witness to this, considering that of the total terrorist attacks world 
over in the last 30 years, only 2 % constitute as those against maritime targets 
(Greenberg, Chalk et al, 2006). In terror tactics, media attention is paramount since 
this is an effective way to spread fear, cause panic and instil distrust among citizens 
against the Government’s abilities.  
 
Despite all the above, following 9/11 and ever growing dependence on maritime 
trade world over, the perceived threats of maritime attacks have risen (Greenberg, 
Chalk et al, 2006). Maritime shipping is very vulnerable considering the growing 
volume of shipping traffic (6.7% as per UNCTAD, 2009), low crew complement and 
                                                 
19 See Chronology of LTTE suicide bomb attacks for details on LTTE’s suicide attacks available at  
Society for peace, unity and human rights for Sri Lanka  web site http://www.spur.asn.au/chronology 
_of_ suicide_bomb_attacks_by_Tamil_Tigers_in_sri_Lanka.htm 
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restricted speeds due to congested choke points.  Containerization has also brought 
the risk of WMD (weapon of mass destruction) proliferation, and biological or 
chemical attack.  Offshore oil fields or oil platforms are also high interest targets as 
the destruction of these would put the world economy in chaos notwithstanding the 
environmental impact.  
 
Asymmetric terrorist attacks against maritime targets can be realized by using 
explosives-laden suicide boats, light aircraft and gliders; merchant and cruise ships 
as guided missiles to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform; 
commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to 
infiltrate ports; and unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles.  Further 
mines or vessel’s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural 
gas, can also be utilized as ingredients for explosion.  
 
Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing interest in using small boats to attack 
military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities.  The tactics and techniques 
of using small boats to emplace or deliver improvised explosive devices have proven 
effective and exportable (Carafano, 2007).  Threats from small boats are very viable 
since they are simple, low cost and effective in evading detection or can act as 
perfect camouflage among groups of fishing or leisure vessels (Parfomak & Frittelli, 
2007).  The Mumbai 26/1120 attacks bear testimony to the lurking danger posed by 
small boats to maritime security.  
 
3.4.2 Threats from piracy 
Piracy in the maritime domain has been an age old practice starting from the early 
days of seafaring. Julius Caesar was once captured and held captive by Cilicia 
                                                 
20 See news item Terrorists in Mumbai attack arrive by boat. (2008, November 27). IBI News 
available at World Wide Web :http://www.ibinews.com/ibinews/newsdesk /20081027134010 
ibinews.html  
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pirates.  Piracy once flourished under state sponsorship under a different name, as 
privateering.  King Henry III is known to be the first to give such licenses (O’Meara, 
2007).  Piracy, however, started declining by the beginning of the nineteenth century 
and by the twentieth century piracy was considered to be a thing of the past and 
mentions were found only in literary works.  Post the Cold war era, maritime piracy 
surfaced again though it is suggested by analysts like Peter Lehr (2009) that the 
piratical attacks during the period of the Cold War could not succeed due to heavy 
patrolling of warships albeit for different reasons and not anti piracy.  Modern Piracy 
is as complex as its definition.  The International Maritime Bureau defines piracy as; 
 
The act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime 
and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act (IMB, 
2010).  
 
Piracy in accordance with Article 101 of UNCLOS is defined as: 
 
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or 
private aircraft and directed: 
(a)  On the high seas, against another ship or persons or property on 
board such ship; 
(b)  Against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; 
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in the 
subparagraph a or b above. (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982) 
 
Piracy today is rampant around the Horn of Africa due to the Somali pirates, who 
have wreaked havoc on ships in the Gulf of Aden and beyond even 1000nm from the 
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shores of Somalia. The increasing range of piratical operations can be gleaned from 
the advisories issued by IMB21. Piracy in the Malacca Straits has declined due to 
effective patrolling by the Southeast Asian navies. Pirates today are heavily armed 
and possess sophisticated weaponry and equipment. They have automatic weapons; 
rocket propelled grenades, satellite phones and high powered outboard engines 
powering light agile fibre glass boats.  
 
The Somali pirates operate with mother vessels which cater for their logistics and 
food thereby allowing them increased operational range and endurance to attack 
unarmed and innocent merchant ships with increasing success. Modern piracy is 
complex and multiphased.   Piracy operations consist of an assemblage of three types 
of groups: (1) ex-fishermen who have intimate knowledge of the sea; (2) ex-
militiamen who have manpower, strength and combat skills; and, (3) technical 
experts who can operate hi-tech equipment such as GPS systems and military 
hardware to assist with navigation and the detection of shipping targets. (Ross & 
David, 2009).  
 
ICC International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) annual 
report indicates that in the year 2009, a total of 406 incidents of piracy and armed 
robbery were reported (IMB, 2010).  The last time piracy figures surpassed 400 
incidents was in 2003. The year 2009 was also the third successive year to report an 
increase in piratical incidents from the previous year.  Figure 6 indicates the growing 
menace of maritime piracy in the recent years.  Modern day piracy is a violent, 
bloody, ruthless practice and is being carried out with increasing expertise and range 
of operation making it another potent asymmetric threat in the maritime domain to 
reckon with. 
 
 
                                                 
21 IMB warnings which required mariners to keep at least 50 nm off Somali coast in 2002 now 
recommends (as of April 2010) to keep off at least 600nm from that coast (IMB, 2010). 
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Figure 6-Piratical attacks 2006-200922. 
 
 
3.4.3 Threats from insurgency 
 The dictionary23   defines insurgency as  
 
a condition of revolt against a government that is less than organized 
revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.  
 
Insurgency matters to maritime security because of its relation to transnational 
terrorism. Insurgency groups like LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) though 
now a disbanded organization following the defeat and death of their Chief 
Prabhakaran against the Lankan army, have successfully carried out maritime attacks 
against Lankan naval ships and merchant ships in the past.  Insurgents are a potent 
                                                 
22 Source: International Maritime Bureau (2010). Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual 
report 01January-31 December 2009. Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau. 
23 Source: Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.(11eds)(2003) Springfield MA: Merriam 
Webster.  
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force as they have local support and this distinguishes them from terrorists. 
Insurgents, however, use terrorism as a tactic in the furtherance of their aim. 
Insurgent violence takes many forms. Table 3 24  reflects the form and the 
characteristics associated with each. 
 
Table 3-Forms of insurgent violence 
 
 
As the ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for 
control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions into sharing 
political power, there is a tendency to use asymmetric warfare techniques against 
established power structures or infrastructure facilities such as ports or ships or 
offshore platforms. Most insurgency groups engage in arms, human and drug 
smuggling, counterfeit, fraud, money laundering, cargo theft and other maritime 
crimes in order to finance their activities (Hansen, 2009). The MIPT (Memorial 
Institute for Prevention of Terrorism) database (see Figure 7) has reflected steady 
growth in insurgent attacks and related fatalities world over.  Due to the growing 
commercial importance of maritime infrastructures for a state’s progress it is very 
likely that insurgents would target them.  Thus, the security threat posed by 
                                                 
24Source:  Merari, A.(1993). Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. Terrorism and  Political Violence. 
5 (4), 213-251.  
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insurgency is yet another dimension of various asymmetric threats in the maritime 
domain (Hansen, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 7-Insurgent attacks and fatalities (2002-2006) 25  
 
 
3.4.4 Threats from organised crime 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) gives 
the definition of organized criminal groups as: 
 
a structured group  three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established  in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, financial  or other material benefits. (UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). 
                                                 
25Source: Gompert, et al (2008). War by other means: building complete and balanced 
capabilities for counter insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
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Noting the threat posed by transnational organized crime, the UN Security Council in 
February 201026 noted with concern the serious threat posed to international security 
in different regions of the world and invited the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to consider these threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict 
analysis and integrated missions’ assessment and planning.  International organized 
criminals have evolved from traditional hierarchical structures to loose network 
structures.  The clearest examples are found in countries where insurgents draw 
funds from taxing, or even managing organized criminal activities, particularly drug 
trafficking.  Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an organized crime syndicate, bombed Super 
ferry 14 killing 117 people in the year 2004 against non payment of extortion money 
by the ferry owners (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010).  
 
Piracy in Somalia is also an organized crime activity. Organized crime syndicates 
sometimes establish a pseudo state, as in Somalia, where rebels gain exclusive 
control of a portion of a country. The pseudo-states have no international 
accountability and, particularly when strategically placed, often become trafficking 
hubs and retail centres for all manner of illicit goods and services (Sorenson, 2008). 
They pose a threat to international security, providing a safe haven for international 
fugitives, including terrorists.  It can thus be safely concluded from the foregoing that 
threat from organized crime syndicates is an important constituent to the dynamics of 
asymmetric threats in the maritime domain. 
 
                                                 
26 See United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2010). The globalization of crime: A  
transnational organized crime threat assessment available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and- analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf 
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3.5 Vulnerabilities and attractiveness of commercial shipping to asymmetric 
attacks 
Of all the commercial shipping activities, container shipping, cruise and passenger 
liners, LNG, LPG, Chemical and Oil tankers are most vulnerable and at the same 
time attractive to extremists as targets for carrying out asymmetric attacks. The 
attractiveness and vulnerability of the vessels are based on the potential of each type 
of shipping to become a device, by its own means, to disrupt the mechanics of ocean 
trade and also facilitate mass casualty attacks. 
 
3.5.1 Container vessels 
Container shipping is a booming market and with growth rates as high as 12-13% the 
container shipping fleet is likely to double from present levels by 2016 (UNCTAD, 
2009). As a result of its sheer volumes, and since every shipment involves many 
actors: the exporter, the importer, the freight forwarder, customs broker, excise 
inspector, truckers, railroad workers, dock workers, stevedores and also the crews of 
vessels involved, container shipping represents a  viable conduit for covert 
operations for launching an asymmetric attack. According to Rand Corporation data 
(Greenberg et al, 2006), approximately 112,000 merchant vessels, 6,500 ports and 
harbour facilities, and 45,000 shipping bureaus constitute the contemporary 
international maritime transport system, linking roughly 225 coastal nations, 
dependent territories, and island states.  
 
This complex web of international trade offers a huge and daunting challenge to 
security personnel for ensuring comprehensive checks and most of the containers 
transit ports without getting scanned. Even in countries like the U.S. with advanced 
x-ray and gamma scanning technologies, the container inspection rate is only about 
10%, which equates to a scanning rate of one per ten (Block, 2006).  
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Table 4-Summary of consequence-Container ship. 27  
 
 
 
 
Container shipping and the intermodal transport network system associated with it is 
very ubiquitous and pervasive and hence terrorists may view it as an unparalleled 
avenue to transport WMD or explosives to any part of the world. In the absence of 
uniform and comprehensive security regimes in the supply chain activity concerning 
containers coupled with rudimentary technology being availed of by most countries 
with regard to locks for sealing containers, it is not surprising that container vessels 
are considered Trojan horses for covert terrorist logistics operations (Chalk, 2009). 
Table 4 above presents a possible summary of consequences relating to asymmetric 
threats from container vessels. Based on the tangible and intangible consequences, 
one can easily fathom the clear attractiveness of these Trojan horses to terrorists. 
 
                                                 
27 Source: Greenberg, M., Chalk, P., Khilko.I, Ortiz, D.S., & Willis, H. H. (2006). Maritime terrorism: 
risk and liability. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
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3.5.2 Cruise vessels 
The Achille Lauro attack signifies the historic link between cruise vessels and 
terrorism.  Cruise shipping even in this modern age is considered a luxury and 
domain of the elite hence while being a global industry; it is quite geographically and 
economically concentrated. Cruise ships have very particular characteristics that 
qualify them as highly potential targets to terrorists. Today’s cruise liners boast 
carrying capacities of over 5000 (Oasis of the Seas) 28  making them single 
geographical spaces ideally suited for mass casualty attacks.  An attack on such 
iconic vessels involving mass casualties would result in tremendous international 
media attention of the type seen after the terrorist attack of Mumbai 26/11 and 
piratical attack on Seabourn Spirit.  
 
Such large scale publicity is crucial to the business of international terrorism to 
demonstrate the operational capability of a particular terrorist outfit, spread panic and 
fear among local population,  facilitate economic loss (like scaring away investment 
and tourism) and  generate lack of faith among populations in their governments' 
ability to protect them.   
 
The vulnerability of cruise ships arises from the lack of rigorous baggage and 
personnel screening (only 2% are physically inspected), non vetting of support staff 
associated with the cruise business (mainly dockworkers /casual labourers hired on 
daily basis), prolonged stops at anchorages for passenger sightseeing and publicly 
available fixed itineraries (Chalk, 2009).  These factors make these ships highly 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  Table 5 lists the consequences arising out of a 
possible terrorist attack on a cruise ship. 
 
 
                                                 
28 See Oasis of the Seas. (n.d.).  Royal Caribbean International available at  
http://www.royalcaribbean.com/findacruise/ships/class/ship/home.do?shipCode=OA 
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Table 5-Summary of consequence-Cruise ships29
 
 
 
3.5.3 Passenger ferries 
 The bombing by Abu Sayyaf Group of Super ferry-14, which killed 116 passengers, 
perhaps best exemplifies terrorists’ interest in these kinds of vessels. Though not 
belonging to the same iconic and illustrious class as cruise vessels, the passenger 
ferries do constitute almost the same economic value as that associated with 
container shipping. The human factor increases its value further since an attack 
against a passenger ferry will definitely kill more people than an attack on a 
container vessel. The vulnerability of ferries to terrorists generates from the lack of 
                                                 
29Greenberg, et al (2006), supra note 27. 
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comprehensive security cover due to high volumes of traffic, limited time in port for 
more trips to and fro, almost nil baggage or vehicle checks, limited vetting of 
onboard and associated staff as most are employed on seasonal and adhoc basis to 
cater for workloads during peak tourist season. Moreover like cruise vessels, ferries 
have fixed itineraries and routes. Some ferry operators publicly publish the complete 
layout of the ferry which makes it convenient for an extremist outfit to devise plans 
for carrying out a clandestine attack targeting maximum casualties. Table 6,30 shown 
below, reflects the likely scenarios and their consequence.  
 
 
Table 6-Summary of consequence -Passenger ferry 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Source : Greenberg et al (2006), supra note 27. 
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3.5.4 LPG, LNG and oil tankers 
According to World Energy Outlook 2009, fossil fuel remains the most dominant 
source of primary energy accounting for 75% of global energy needs for the period 
2006-2030 (International Energy Agency, 2009).  Energy is very critical to a nation’s 
infrastructure and growth.  It is a nation’s lifeline and hence has been considered as a 
key strategic target since the First World War.  Wars have also been fought in the 
past in order to gain control over oil resources so as to have energy security.  Nations 
continue to explore alternate resources to compensate this dwindling reservoir of 
black gold; however, the rising demand in this sector has also provided the requisite 
boost to its transportation. LPG,LNG and Product carriers are all associated with the 
carriage of inflammable and potentially explosive cargoes thus making them score 
high on the terrorist list of desirable targets as can be made out from the attack on 
MT Limburg and the latest incident (if confirmed31) related to  MT M Star.   
 
Sea trade of crude oil accounts for two thirds of tanker cargoes i.e. out of 2.75 billion 
tonnes of tanker cargo, 1.83 tonnes constitutes crude oil (UNCTAD, 2009). This 
outright majority outlines the inescapable strategic importance of this trade to the 
global economy. Tankers like VLCCs and ULCCs are iconic structures and, 
therefore, the cargoes they carry are also of huge capital interest to terrorists and 
pirates alike.  Product tankers when loaded with volatile cargo are more vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks due to the explosive nature of the cargo carried (Burns, 2009).  Fully 
laden tankers have limitations in manoeuvrability and are usually slow; as a result 
they are targets of opportunity for terrorists.  Further, the low freeboard and highly 
volatile cargo are a bonus to any terrorist group planning such an attack. The latest 
                                                 
31 See  Calvo, A ( 2010, August 10). M stands for mystery. Pan Orient News available at 
http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=284. M Star, a Japanese VLCC tanker, was damaged 
by an explosion July 28, 2010 off UAE. Early reports suggested terror attack however local sources 
have denied the same. Clearer picture  will only emerge after  detailed investigations.   
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IMB statistics32 indicate that piratical attacks tend to be slightly more frequent than 
those against Bulk carriers (117 tankers33/109 bulk carriers). Tankers carrying out 
underway replenishment or ship to ship transfer virtually become sitting ducks 
because of their restricted ability to manoeuvre under these conditions. Tankers, thus, 
are undoubtedly prize targets considering the scale of the potential catastrophe (see 
Table 7) that can be caused by the cargo they carry. 
 
Table 7-Summary of consequence-Oil, chemical and product carrier 
 
 
                                                 
32 International Maritime Bureau (2010). Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report 01 
January-31 December 2009. Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau . 
33 Tankers include all kinds including product, chemical, LNG/LPG and bitumen tanker. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Asymmetric threats in the maritime domain appear too remote based on statistics and 
the incident profile so far; so was 9/11 before it actually happened.  Asymmetry is an 
important concept as a strategy in modern times. Asymmetric threats are real, 
dynamic and elusive. Asymmetric attacks against vulnerable maritime targets, 
especially shipping, though infrequent and dispersed cannot be ignored.  Even 
though the actors staging asymmetric deeds may be pirates, terrorists, crime 
syndicates or insurgent groups, the tactics employed and the deeds done are bound to 
be similar at least in terms of consequence.  It is thus important to understand the 
organisation and capability of the perpetrators in order to assess the threat they pose 
and to measure the adequacy of counter strategy. 
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Chapter 4 
Maritime Asymmetric attacks: organizations, capability and network 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Maritime security threats as discussed in the previous chapters basically emanate 
from activities of terrorists, pirates, organized crime syndicates and insurgents. 
Armed robbery or coastal zone piracy incidents are also included as part of the 
overall threats from pirates. These agents of asymmetric threats, based on their type, 
idiosyncrasy, location and capability, operate differently and hence the security risk 
from each also varies considerably. Writers and analysts have indicated that despite 
9/11 and Osama Bin Laden’s threats to cut off the lifelines of the global economy, 
there have been no major strikes against maritime targets as very few terror 
organizations have the inclination or capability to strike at sea (Lehr, 2009).  
 
However, the growing range of operations of Somali pirates, who strike at ships 
underway as far as 1000 nm from the coast even while in the presence of the 
conglomeration of the World’s best Navies, should not be taken lightly. This chapter 
discusses organizational networks of terror organizations/syndicates or groups, their 
maritime capability, modus operandi, sources of funding and possible nexus with 
each other for mutual benefit.  
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4.2 Terrorist organisation 
 Most terror groups do not have maritime capability because operations at sea require 
minimum attributes or skills as a mariner, the basics of which are boat or ship 
handling, survival at sea and seamanship.  Further, in order to be able to carry out 
subsurface suicide or underwater attacks, the terrorists need to be qualified in scuba 
diving and be experts in underwater explosion or else at least must have some basic 
training in these aspects.  These are formidable obstacles which require additional 
funding, infrastructure and greater inclination. Some terrorists’ organizations like 
ASG overcame these obstacles by diversifying their operations i.e. operating crime 
syndicates for running piracy, extortion, narcotics, money fraud or hawala 
transactions, cyber crimes related to illegal activities to fund their major operations 
(Banlaoi, 2005).  There are others that approach or cooperate with other crime 
organizations or syndicate or insurgency groups on a mutual interest basis for 
training facilities and resources.  Any terror outfit that is capable of planning and 
executing asymmetric attacks, furthering strategic partnerships and cooperating with 
other groups must have a fully functional organizational matrix.  
 
 
 
Figure 8-Typical terrorist organisational setup 
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Some terror groups have very complex networks, intermixed with the local 
population thus making it difficult for security forces to identify them and take 
preventive measures. Most traditional terror groups in the past have followed the 
typical hierarchical model as shown in Figure 8. However, modern terror groups 
engaged in asymmetric warfare have incorporated the cellular network which is 
difficult to impregnate and at the same time effective in carrying out attacks covertly 
(Decision Support System Inc, 2001). 
    
4.3 Categories of terrorist organisations 
Globally, terror organizations are differentiated into various categories based on 
specific criteria. Terror organisations can be categorised in differing ways. The U.S. 
military guide categorises terrorist groups as those coming under ideological, 
motivational and geographical categories. The ideological categories describe the 
political, religious or social orientation groups of terrorists. Motivational categories 
cover separatist, ethnocentric, nationalistic and revolutionary types of terrorist 
groups. Domestic and international terrorism fall under the geographical category of 
terrorist groups (Stepanova, 2008).  
 
Functionally, modern terrorism is categorised into classic peace time (leftist and right 
wing terrorism), conflict related (Chechen, Kashmiri, Palestinian and Tamil) and 
super terrorism (Al-Qaida’s global jihad) (Stepanova, 2008). It is very important to 
have complete knowledge about the category and objective of any terror group in 
order to contain its local/national/international conglomerations. Understanding the 
mindset of any terror group is pertinent to analysis and mitigation of the type of risk 
emanating from that organisation or group as terror groups tend to be copy cats i.e. 
they usually carry out types of attacks which have been proven to be successful 
elsewhere by them or their networked groups (Lehr,2009).  
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The proliferation of terror knowledge is usually shared among groups having 
common objectives or goals or interests as many groups do not have the type of 
capability to carry out a large scale attack in every sphere. This lack of capability in 
carrying out a particular type of attack is compensated for by exchange of expertise 
through the terror network. Maritime terror capability, particularly involving ships 
and boats, is one such attribute.  
 
4.4 Terrorist organisations having maritime capability 
Operating at sea as discussed in chapter 3, is quite complex and requires terrorists to 
possess decent mariner skills and some familiarity with handling ships or boats. 
Notwithstanding the skills required, there exist quite a handful of terror groups that 
have developed this capability and pose a credible threat to maritime assets. A 
description of some of the infamous terror groups that have developed maritime 
capability or have used maritime targets to strike terror in the past are mentioned 
below: 
4.4.1 Al-Qaeda(AQ) 
4.4.1.1  Description  
Al Qaeda was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 with Arabs to fight against 
former Soviet occupation. 
4.4.1.2  Maritime capability  
The organisation carried out the bombings of USS Cole and Limburg in 2000 and 
2003. Its recent plans to attack shipping targets in the Suez Canal were foiled by 
Egyptian authorities (International Institute of Counter Terrorism, 2009). 
4.4.2 Al-Shabab 
4.4.2.1  Description  
Al-Shabaab (aka the Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, al-Shabab, Shabaab, the Youth, 
Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement) is an Islamic 
organization that controls much of southern Somalia, excluding the capital, 
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Mogadishu.  It has waged an insurgency against Somalia's transitional government 
and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. Shabaab is nominally led by Sheikh 
Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman "Abu Zubeyr," though experts say a core group of 
senior leaders guide its actions (Hanson, 2010). 
4.4.2.2  Maritime Capability 
 Al-Shabaab has been linked to Somali pirates and also Al Qaeda. The organisation is 
yet to carry out any attacks against maritime targets.  However, the organisation has 
controls over those regions of Somalia where pirates are thriving, pointing to an 
alleged linkup with piracy as an offshoot for financing its insurgency operations. 
Further Al Qaeda‘s presence and training activities with Al Shabaab in Somalia have 
also been endorsed by the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia (Sharmarke, 2009). 
4.4.3 ASG 
4.4.3.1 Description  
Abu Sayyaf, whose name means "bearer of the sword" in Arabic, is a militant 
organization based in the southern Philippines. It seeks a separate Islamic state for 
the country's Muslim minority. Its first leader was Abdurajak Janjalani, a Philippine 
Muslim who fought in the international Islamist brigade in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet occupation (Cronin, Aden et al, 2004). 
4.4.3.2  Maritime Capability 
The Abu Sayyaf Group carried out bombing attacks against MV Doulos in 1991 and 
Super ferry 14 in 2004.  The group is also famous for carrying out kidnap for ransom 
(Banlaoi, 2005). 
4.4.4 Hezbollah 
4.4.4.1 Description 
 Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and ideologically inspired by the 
Iranian revolution, Hezbollah was formed in response to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon (Cronin, Aden et al, 2004). 
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4.4.4.2 Maritime Capability 
 Hezbollah attacked the Israeli container port of Ashdod in 2004 and in July 2006, 
Hezbollah attacked and destroyed an Israeli naval corvette by C-802 guided missiles 
(Richardson, 2006 a). 
4.4.5 JI 
4.4.5.1 Description  
Jemaah Islamiya(JI) is a radical Islamic group that aims to create a strict Islamic state 
in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippine islands, and 
southern Thailand (Cronin, Aden et al, 2004). 
4.4.5.2 Maritime Capability  
JI is yet to be associated with any maritime attacks; however, it was revealed that in 
2001 the organization aimed to bomb visiting U.S. Naval warships. Further evidence 
obtained in 2007 suggested that the Organisation had conducted training to develop 
underwater destruction capability (Raymond, 2007). 
4.4.6 L e T 
4.4.6.1 Description  
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is a radical Islamic group in Pakistan that seeks to  
establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Although primarily focused on freeing 
Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic state there, the group has 
also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all of India as well( Cronin, 
Aden et al, 2004). 
4.4.6.2 Maritime Capability 
The Mumbai 26 November 2008 attacks were carried out by LeT using asymmetric 
amphibious warfare through the use of small boats. New Yorker journalist Steve Coll 
(2008) has testified to being a passenger in LeT’s pontoon boat fleets during 2005 
earthquake in Kashmir. 
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4.4.7 LTTE 
4.4.7.1  Description  
The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka that aimed to establish an 
independent Tamil state including the ethnically Tamil regions of the island. The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran and 
arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a number of Tamil groups opposing 
discrimination against Tamils by the dominant Sinhalese ethnic group (Cronin, Aden 
et al, 2004). Following his death in May 2009, the LTTE became a disbanded 
organization with some of its cadres managing to escape to India and countries in 
South East Asia, Europe and North American countries. 
4.4.7.2 Maritime Capability  
The LTTE raised Sea Tigers and Black Tiger squads to carry out several successful 
attacks against Sri Lankan Naval vessels and a few commercial shipping vessels. 
They targeted Lankan naval and commercial ships using surface and subsurface 
vessels34. The Organisation was also actively engaged in sea piracy35, hijack and 
used hijacked vessels as phantom vessels for smuggling narcotics weapons and other 
illegal stores. 
 
4.5 Piracy, terrorism, organised crime and insurgency nexus 
Terror operations, like any military operation, require adequate human, material and 
financial resources for sustenance. Many terror and insurgency groups resort to 
various forms of criminal activity in order to finance their operations as well as to 
run their organisations. Terror operations unlike insurgency are generally cheap and 
                                                 
34 See Chronology of suicide bomb attacks by LTTE available at Society for peace, unity and human 
rights for Sri Lanka  web site http://www.spur.asn.au/ chronology _ of _suicide_bomb_attacks_by 
_Tamil _Tigers_in_sri_Lanka.htm. 
35   See the LTTE in brief. (n.d.). Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at 
Geneva available at  World Wide Web:http://www.defence.lk /pps / LTTE in brief.pdf  
. 
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hence easy to finance. Table 836 provides approximate data on costs incurred by 
terror groups to carry out world famous terror conspiracies.  
 
Table 8-Cost (approx) for terror attacks 
 
  
Terror organisations sometimes use undercover or complicit charities and businesses 
to support their causes. However, illegal and money laundering activities are also 
being resorted to by terrorists, organised crime syndicates and insurgency groups 
alike in order to generate finances. Groups like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have been 
suspected to resort to illicit diamond trading to generate funds whilst groups like the 
Taliban have been linked to the drugs trade (Moller, 2009). LTTE (Greenberg et al, 
2006) and ASG (Merrari, 1993) are known to use extortion, sea piracy and drugs 
trade to generate finances. Al Shabaab, the Somali insurgent group has reportedly 
established a protection fund for pirates wherein 5-10% of ransom money is being 
paid by the pirates to operate from the territory controlled by Al Shabaab.  Reports of 
Al Shabaab using pirates to train its militia men to form an independent maritime 
force provide fodder for a possible terrorism piracy nexus (Mendez, 2009). It is thus 
not inconceivable that, for financial benefit, terrorists   may use all possible means to 
generate finances including approaching pirates or even resorting to piracy; however, 
considering the fundamental incompatibility between the objective interests of 
                                                 
36 Source: Terrorist financing. (2008, February 29). OECD Financial action task force report available 
at World Wide Web:http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd /28/43/40285899.pdf.  All cost estimates 
except London bombings from UN monitoring team on Al Qaeda and Taliban. 
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terrorists and pirates, such a marriage of convenience may not have a long term 
perspective.  
 
4.6 Modus operandi 
Modern terrorists in order to make more and more audacious attacks, have used 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and Vehicle (Vessel) borne improvised 
explosive devices. The use of COTS (commercially available off the shelf) 
equipment makes it more complex and intriguing. The use of IEDs or VBIEDs in 
terror attacks are called low impact high probability attacks, which is asymmetric 
attack at its best (Lehr, 2009). The smuggling of IEDs on board ships is more 
probable than smuggling WMDs. The Superferry-14 bombing by ASG was 
accomplished by placing an IED inside a television. Another variant of a maritime 
IED attack was used by Shite insurgents against British Royal Marines by exploding 
the device kept in the end of a pier where the river patrol had to pass (Lehr, 2009).  A 
LTTE VBIED, (Vessel or Vehicle borne improvised explosive device) as shown in 
the Figure 937 was actively used to carry out its suicide sub- surface attacks against 
maritime targets. There is also significant risk from remotely operated underwater 
vehicles and underwater divers using autonomous underwater vehicles or diver 
driven vehicles. These devices are COTS equipment and can be purchased by 
anybody. 
 
                                                 
37Source: LTTE chronology  Supra  note 34. 
 
 
50
  
 
Figure 9-LTTE suicide VBIED 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Asymmetric threats emanating from terrorists, pirates, insurgents and organised 
crime syndicates or from a joint nexus of these evil forces through proliferation of 
terror knowledge, offer low cost, high probability options to these perpetrators. The 
IEDs and VBIEDs made from COTS equipment and carried onboard ships hidden in 
daily-use, common house hold items  indicates the range of improvisation of 
explosive options available for carrying out varying types of asymmetric attacks. The 
maritime states must never take chances with these threats. Rather, they must 
continuously develop strong counter strategies through maritime security initiatives 
and domain awareness tools to deter such attacks, taking obvious cognizance of the 
fact that certain tough countermeasures can also be detrimental to the freedom of 
navigation principles. 
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Chapter 5 
Threat countermeasures and impacts on navigational freedoms 
 
5.1  Introduction   
Asymmetric threats in the maritime domain whether due to piracy, terrorism, 
organised crime or insurgency are all forms of violent interference to the freedom of 
navigation. Curbing these violent manifestations of modern day maritime crime calls 
for effective countermeasures. These countermeasures are constituted by 
international Conventions and resolutions, regulations arising out of the law of the 
land, surveillance including intelligence gathering activities and effective law 
enforcement mechanisms. UNCLOS 82, often referred to as the constitution of the 
oceans (Koh, 1982) addressed only the piratical forms of asymmetric threats and due 
to it being hugely silent on other forms of asymmetric threats including terrorism, 
maritime nations looked for solutions through newer security initiatives following 
terror attacks on the Achille Lauro and the World Trade Centre. This chapter 
analyses the important international maritime security initiatives, UN Security 
Council Resolutions, surveillance/domain awareness and their impacts on 
navigational freedoms.  
 
 5.2 International Ship and Port facility Security Code 
The ISPS Code was brought in by the IMO (International Maritime Organisation) 
following the September 11 attack as a comprehensive security regime to enhance 
maritime security and came into force on 01 July 2004. The Code, incorporated as an 
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additional chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) to SOLAS 
74 (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea as amended), consists of 
two parts: A and B.  Part A is compulsory and part B consists of recommendatory 
guidelines. The U.S., however, has made it mandatory for all foreign as well as its 
national ships to comply with the part B guideline. The European Union has also 
made some sections of part ‘B’ as mandatory for its member states (Mazaheri, 2008). 
The Code applies to cargo and passenger ships of gross tonnage over 500 tons, 
including high speed crafts, mobile offshore drilling units and port facilities serving 
such ships engaged in international voyage. 
 
5.2.1 Working of the Code 
In order to ensure compliance, all state parties are required by the Code to certify the 
qualification of the ship security officer (SSO), issue ISSC (international ship 
security certificate) and approve the ship security plan (SSP) in respect of each ship 
flying their respective flag. The flag state administration is also required to set the 
level of security for its fleet in general and for each port facility to be visited by its 
fleet. Once the ship approaches a particular port, it is tracked and its identity verified 
for grant of access. The ship then calls at the port and the PFSO (port facility security 
officer) of that port may visit onboard to check documents and level of security. The 
ship has to show a continuous synopsis record (CSR) for its last ten voyages, cargo 
manifests, crew lists, and other security related information to the PFSO. This is the 
standard practice for a compliant ship. In case of a non compliant ship, access may or 
may not be granted to enter the port depending upon the policy measures being 
enforced at that particular port.  
 
5.2.2 ISPS Code and asymmetric threats  
It can be debated whether the ISPS Code fully addresses the asymmetric threat 
element; however, because of the enhanced security culture, the Code, might address 
threats through a preventative and mitigative angle. Undoubtedly the Code is a 
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preventive mechanism to deter terror outfits from gaining easy access to maritime 
facilities like ports, ships and mobile offshore drilling units. The Code requires the 
ship(facility) to have a security plan in place to deter unauthorised access, enhanced 
vigilance and appropriate training of crew so that preventive measures can be taken 
whilst in passage or in an area  of terror hotspots. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this 
aspect, which is its over reliance on a ship’s unarmed and non combatant crew to 
mount the first line of defence against an asymmetric attack, has been considered as 
its biggest drawback. 
 
Further, the Code not only fails to cater for threats arising from small boats, fishing 
vessels or vessels with gross tonnage less than 500, but also is not mandatory for 
vessels not engaged in international voyage.  These are the kinds of vessels that can 
be used by terrorists to gain access to a moving ship or worse as suicide crafts. They 
can also be used as secondary targets to blow up an oil platform, port or harbour 
facility. The Code is also grossly silent on piracy, and the facility response measures 
against such, or terror attacks (Chawla, 2004). The piracy attacks off the Gulf of 
Aden have continued unabated even though ships attacked are fully ISPS compliant.  
The ISPS Code, though introduced hastily, was sold to the shipping industry on the 
premise that it would address the threat of terrorism; however, six years later, the 
reality is far from that envisaged. Today terrorism is a far cry for the shipping 
industry as it continues to grapple with immediate challenges from piracy and armed 
robbery at sea (Raymond & Morrien, 2009). The ISPS Code thus has to be 
considered only as a procedural safeguard or bench mark standard for maritime 
security and not as a mechanism to address all the threats concerning multimodal 
transport and supply chain activities. 
 
5.2.3 ISPS and navigational freedoms  
The ISPS Code mandates that maritime administrations set security levels for each 
and every port depending upon the perceived threats. In cases where ships have 
lower security standards than the level expected by the Contracting Government of 
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the port of call, the ship is required to comply with the requirements of that 
Contracting Government or else it will face an entry ban to that particular port due to 
compliance failure (Bazan, 2007). Further, in case a compliant ship calls at a non 
compliant port and thereafter calls at a compliant port, the ship is subject to greater 
scrutiny or may even be denied entry because of the security compromise or possible 
contamination based on ISPS standards.  
 
Let us consider a hypothetical situation to analyse practically the impediments to a 
vessel due to a terror incident onboard. Suppose on passage from the Persian Gulf to 
Amsterdam off the Bay of Biscay, the crew of a Polish tanker accidently detect the 
presence of a WMD device in the pump room. The Master activates the SSAS signal 
and it is received by the flag administration in Warsaw. The flag administration, 
considering the urgency of the situation, informs the Master to seek the assistance of 
the coastal state, in this case, France. The coastal state considering the potential 
danger of a WMD device can always deny a place of refuge (Erika and Prestige 
incident) owing to the threat from the bomb to its public and can also order the ship 
to keep out of its territorial waters. Requests for refuge may also be turned down by 
other coastal states like the Netherlands, Spain and Britain considering the threat.  In 
the event of such a scenario the navigational freedoms of the ship may be severely 
restricted.  Sometimes the situation may not improve even if the device is removed 
safely, as the fact that the ship’s security was indeed compromised would portray a 
general lack of security standards which would entail undue restriction to the ship at 
its NPC (next port of call) and further subsequent calls at other ports even though the 
ship may be fully compliant with the Code.  
 
5.3  Suppression of unlawful acts against safety of maritime navigation (SUA 
1988 and 2005 Protocol) 
SUA 1988 was drafted by the legal committee of the IMO as an aftermath to the 
hijacking of Italian flagged cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985. The Convention 
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defines unlawful acts and obliges state parties to either extradite or prosecute the 
alleged offenders.  
 
5.3.1 SUA Protocols  
SUA treaties of 1988 were developed to deal with terrorist acts due to the mention of 
terrorism in its preamble; however, the act itself shied away from mentioning it 
within the text.  Following the 9/11 incident, the IMO adopted Assembly resolution 
A.924 (22)38 to review, with the intent to revise, existing international legal and 
technical measures, and to consider appropriate new measures to prevent and 
suppress terrorism against ships and to improve security onboard and ashore, in order 
to reduce the risk to passengers, crews and port personnel on board ships and in port 
areas and to the vessels and their cargoes (IMO, 2001).  This led to the adoption of 
the 2005 SUA Protocols which sought to supplement the 1988 SUA Treaties by 
strengthening the legal framework to deal with acts that threaten the safety of 
maritime navigation and effectively punish the perpetrators (Mbiah, 2007). The 2005 
Protocols introduced four sub groups of new offences through Article 3bis, namely 
offences with terror motives, transport offences, nuclear proliferation and offences of 
assistance to fugitives.  
 
Thus, the new Protocol considers using or discharging explosives, radioactive 
materials, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons against a ship or from a ship, 
discharging oil, LNG and HNS, using the ship in a manner causing death or serious 
injury or damage as offences for criminal prosecution (Young, 2009). The Protocol 
has also incorporated provisions for boarding at sea through Article 8bis wherein a 
state party can board a vessel flying the flag of another state seaward of the outer 
limits of  its territorial sea or in its EEZ with express permission from the flag state. 
                                                 
38 International Maritime Organisation. (2001, November 20). Review of measures and procedures to 
prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships. 
(Resolution A.924 (22)). 
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Such boarding can also take place in the case that there is no response within four 
hours from the flag state. The boarding provisions, however, have been balanced by 
safeguards to prevent their abuse. The extradition provisions have also been modified 
to outlaw political offence as defence (Mbiah, 2007). 
 
5.3.2 Effectiveness of SUA against asymmetric threats  
The status of the 1988 SUA Convention and its Protocol with respect to contracting 
states is 156 states (94.73% of world tonnage) and 145 states (89.56% of world 
tonnage) respectively.  The status of the 2005 SUA Convention and its Protocol is 16 
states (7.6% world tonnage) and 12 states (6.87%) respectively as of 31 Jul 2010 
(IMO, 2010).39 The Convention has come into force as of July 28, 2010; however, 
the overall effectiveness of the 2005 SUA Protocol depends upon its ratification by 
all states. The principle aim of the SUA Convention is to suppress terrorism as can 
be gleaned from the teleological interpretation of its Preamble. The 2005 Protocol 
addresses terror threats emanating out of WMD and BCN weapons effectively; 
however, it has its own constraints.  
 
The unlawfulness of any act under SUA is contingent on that act endangering or 
compromising the safety of navigation thus limiting its applicability to a great extent. 
This limitation must be removed to make the act more functional and dynamic. 
Further, due to its anti terror orientation SUA does not include acts motivated by 
animo furandi (intent to plunder) or lucri causa (for the sake of financial gain). Thus 
acts of coastal zone piracy, 40  which may also include drug trafficking, are not 
actually criminalised under SUA, if the same does not hinder the safety of navigation 
(Mejia & Mukherjee, 2006). Also according to Robert Beckman (2009), SUA 2005 
may not be of assistance in combating all forms of maritime terrorism, especially 
                                                 
39International Maritime Organisation (2010, July 31). Status of   Conventions available at 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 
40 Coastal Zone Piracy refers to piratical acts taking place within the coastal zone of a state. 
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from those emanating out of rogue states that, for obvious reasons, may not become 
party to the Convention.  The fact that boarding actions if deemed unfounded will 
entail compensation may also act as a deterrent to enforcement in the absence of 
strong intelligence (Spadi, 2006).  Notwithstanding the constraints mentioned in this 
paragraph, the 2005 SUA Protocol is definitely a step in the right direction to bolster 
the fight against terrorism and elements of asymmetric threats. 
 
5.3.3 SUA and navigational freedom  
The 2005 SUA Protocol has come into force only recently and hence the use and 
misuse of the boarding provisions mentioned in the Protocol have not yet come to 
light. The IMO Legal Committee during its 88th session recognised the possible 
interference to freedom of navigation through the boarding provisions.  During the 
course of negotiation the following was stated: 
 
The inclusion of boarding provisions constituted a significant departure from 
the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation on the high seas and 
exclusive jurisdiction of flag states over their vessels.  It was accepted that 
the principle of flag state jurisdiction must be respected to the utmost extent, 
recognized in that a boarding by another state on the high seas could only 
take place in exceptional circumstances. Any exception must be precise, 
unambiguous and internationally accepted (IMO, 2004). 41
 
The incorporation of flag state express approval and also the four hour rule give 
prominence to flag state jurisdiction and protection of navigational freedom to an 
extent; however, the underlying fact remains that interdiction and boarding with or 
without consent do restrict the free movement of shipping.  The Protocol’s reference 
                                                 
41 International Maritime Organisation. (2004, May 18). Report of the Legal Committee on the work of 
its eighty-eighth session, agenda item 13.  
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to other international Conventions and regimes that prohibit transport of particular 
materials complicates the matter further as identifying the criminal character of the 
material concerned would require a subjective or objective assessment including a 
determination of whether the concerned states have included the Conventions in the 
list whilst applying the SUA Protocols in order to ascertain the criminality of 
material (Chai, 2007).  
 
The Protocol also creates legal uncertainty on matters regarding the release of toxic 
materials from ships as it fails to aptly quantify or classify materials as for criminal 
purposes for obvious reasons because there are many chemicals which have dual or 
multiple uses and hence classifying them as criminal under SUA would severely 
impact the global chemical business. This legal uncertainty would make the 
enforcement agencies of the states concerned the final arbiters in construing and 
applying the Protocol and hence situations wherein naughty 42  states trying to 
interfere in peaceful movement of goods and persons at sea or the freedom of 
navigation cannot be ruled out in future(Chai, 2007).  
 
5.4 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  
The proliferation security initiative is an initiative by the United States to establish a 
coalition of willing partners to respond to the proliferation of WMD. The PSI is 
outside the concept of treaty and is to be understood as a framework for international 
cooperation to deal with the proliferation of WMD (Beckman, 2005).  The PSI was 
announced in 2003 by then American President George .W. Bush in Poland.  
 
                                                 
42 The term naughty states has been used by Prof Lee Sik Chai,  Chairman of IMO Legal committee, 
as an obvious reference to  rogue states that constantly abuse or distort  international law for their 
advantage. 
 
 
59
  
5.4.1 Endorsement to PSI  
When a country endorses PSI, it endorses the PSI Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SIP), which commits participants to establish a more coordinated and 
effective basis through which to impede and stop WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related items (U.S. Department of State, 2007).  The countries commit to the 
following: 
 
1. Interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities;  
2. Develop procedures to facilitate exchange of information with other 
countries;  
3. Strengthen national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction and take 
specific actions in support of interdiction efforts.  
 
5.4.2  Scope and legal status of PSI  
The main objective of PSI is to impede and stop shipments of WMD, WMD delivery 
systems and related materials flowing to and from states and non state actors of 
proliferation concern (Thomas, 2009).  PSI has the support of ninety seven states as 
of 06 Aug 2010.43  The states participating in PSI are not treaty bound but they do 
make political commitments to act in accordance with the SIP.  The PSI is a highly 
selective non proliferation initiative based on unilateral action of a state against 
another state or non state actor emanating out of unilateral threat perception of that 
participating state. This unilateral determination which can be politically motivated 
or based on assumed threat perception of proliferation allows the participating state 
to interdict the ship of any state or a particular target state or non state actor 
(Thomas, 2009).  
 
                                                 
43 See information on status of PSI membership available at World Wide Web: http://www.state.gov /r 
/ pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142823.htm. Status as on August 06, 2010. 
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Such unilateral actions can be seen as threat of use of force by the victim state citing 
violation of the provisions of Art 2(4) of U.N. Charter44 according to which no state 
can indulge in the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of another state.  In the 2005 SUA Protocol, the boarding provisions of 
PSI were included by the PSI states to match the SIP and legalise the PSI boarding; 
however, based on the general desire to preserve the freedom of navigation, express 
approval of flag states was included as one of the mandatory conditions.  The U.S. in 
its efforts to enforce PSI has entered into bilateral boarding agreements with some of 
the PSI participating states which allow the U.S. to board a ship of a third state under 
the authorisation of a state party to the agreement.  Though the SIP indicates that the 
boarding provisions are conducted in accordance with international law, the state 
practice, however, has been to reposition the international law to legitimise the PSI 
as can be garnered by the inclusion of PSI boarding provisions in the 2005 SUA 
Protocol (Spadi, 2006; Prosser & Scoville, 2004). 
 
5.4.3  PSI and asymmetric threats  
PSI has no institutional structure as it is a political commitment by participating 
states. PSI has, however, generated a growing practice of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements in support of interdictions of foreign flagged vessels suspected of 
carrying WMD, WMD devices or related material in spite of the lack of any legal 
authority for the same in UNCLOS (Thomas, 2009).  Foreign naval forces or coast 
guards can only stop and search a foreign flagged ship on the high seas under 
specific narrowly defined circumstances mentioned under UNCLOS Art 110.  PSI 
participants would not have the authority to stop the vessel of another state that is not 
a PSI participant, and doing so could be seen as an act of war (Thomas, 2009).  PSI 
success can only be gauged once it is legitimised and universally accepted. However, 
                                                 
44 See charter of the United Nations available at http://www.un.org/en/documents /charter /chapter 1. 
shtml 
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John Bolton (2004)45  attributed PSI as instrumental in Libya’s denouncement of its 
WMD programme. PSI‘s legality was underpinned by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (Richardson, 2006b) and more recently by the coming into force of 
the SUA Protocol of 2005. Out of 192 UN member states, 97 have already endorsed 
PSI and it is slowly but surely advancing to attain its global reach, which will mean 
universal acceptance to actions that previously would have only been undertaken 
during war.  
 
Logistically, too, there are many difficulties that must be worked through. Detecting 
small amounts of nuclear materials can be very challenging. It is easy to imagine the 
diplomatic uproar if a ship was stopped under the PSI based on a false reading 
(Richardson, 2006b; Coyle & Samson, 2009).  Finally, proper disposition of the 
goods seized under the PSI is also unclear. With the nebulous haze surrounding the 
PSI, it is possible that a potential participant could decide against taking steps to stop 
a ship presumed to have a WMD load (Thomas, 2009).  These legal aspects cast a 
cloud on the PSI’s capability to address the WMD proliferation and the asymmetric 
threat of its use by terrorists. Notwithstanding the legality concepts and the problems 
associated with the PSI, the initiative can definitely play a greater role in prohibiting 
proliferation of WMD and its systems into wrong hands. Effective intelligence 
sharing, non proliferation cooperation agreements and legal interdictions can help 
reform the international security system so as to enable it to meet the asymmetric 
challenges of the 21st century. 
 
                                                 
45  Bolton, J. (2004, September 7). All out war on proliferation. Financial Times .available at   
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/36035.pdf. He claimed that  [I]nterception, in cooperation 
with the U.K., Germany, and Italy, of the BBC China, a vessel loaded with nuclear-related 
components, helped convince Libya that the days of undisturbed accumulation of WMD were over, 
and helped unravel A.Q. Khan's network.  
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5.4.4 PSI and navigational freedoms  
Moves for the acceptance of the principles represented in the PSI, as part of the 
larger body of international law, are manifested the most, in attempts to relegate the 
existing regime on freedom of navigation envisaged under UNCLOS. The SIP 
provisions of interdiction and boarding of vessels suspected to carry WMD is not 
authorised under Art 110 of UNCLOS. The extension of SIP of PSI to contiguous 
zone is also not in accordance with the UNCLOS as the rights of a flag state in 
internal, territorial and contiguous zones of a coastal state are totally different. States 
enjoy full criminal jurisdiction over all ships in their internal waters as can be 
gleaned by international acceptance of port state controls.  
 
In territorial waters, ships of all states are subject to coastal state laws but they also 
enjoy the right of innocent passage. The criminal jurisdiction of a coastal state cannot 
be enforced on transiting foreign vessels except under the conditions listed in Art 
27(1) of UNCLOS which does not include WMD. Undoubtedly any interdiction and 
boarding in territorial waters based on PSI constitutes a denial of innocent passage 
and further, the same, if carried out in contiguous zone, is detrimental to high seas 
freedom of navigation enjoyed by all states. Thus it is reasonable to assume that 
boarding provisions of PSI as stipulated by SIP will have impacts on the navigational 
freedoms envisaged in UNCLOS. 
 
5.5  Maritime domain awareness (MDA)46  
Asymmetric threats, as brought out earlier, are very dynamic and most elusive. 
Maritime security initiatives can only be effective so long as there is a continuous 
flow of actionable intelligence coupled with constant risk assessment and 
development of strategy to counter these threats.  Maritime domain awareness 
                                                 
46 The MDA according to U.S. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness has been 
defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 
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(MDA) is, therefore, all about generating actionable intelligence.   MDA, a term 
coined by the U.S. Coast Guard in late 1990s (Murphy, 2009), came into prominence 
as an initiative of the U.S. following the September 11 attacks to counter maritime 
terror threats and for effective law enforcement at sea. Though initially a U.S. 
initiative, today its relevance as a source for information and early warning is found 
in the doctrines of most of the world’s navies and coastguards (Roman, 2009). 
Maritime shipping47 today is international and very complex. The complexities pose 
a real challenge to law enforcement agencies universally especially when threat 
assessment is based on selective targeting. Tools like MDA are therefore required to 
understand the risk emanating from or to various maritime targets. 
 
 
5.5.1 Achieving MDA  
MDA involves the integration of global maritime intelligence (GMI) and global 
maritime situational awareness (GMSA). GMI48 is the product of legacy as well as 
changing intelligence capabilities, policies and operational relationships used to 
integrate all available data, information and intelligence in order to identify, locate, 
and track potential threats to maritime interests. GMSA49 results from persistent 
monitoring of maritime activities in such a way that trends can be identified and 
anomalies detected. So MDA= GMI + GMSA.  However, fundamental to MDA is 
tracking, which involves the monitoring of vessels and the vessels’ cargo, crews, and 
                                                 
47 The ship can be flagged in one country, bareboat chartered by a company belonging to another 
country, time or voyage chartered by another entity belonging to some other country, manned by crew 
from different parts of the world and can be  carrying cargo for companies or individuals based in 
various other ports of the world. 
48See information on the U.S. national strategy for maritime security: global maritime intelligence 
plan (2005) available at the World Wide Web: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/gmii-plan.pdf. 
49 The U.S. national concept of operations for maritime domain awareness defines GMSA as the 
comprehensive fusion of data from every agency and by every nation to improve knowledge of the 
maritime domain.  
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passengers, to rapidly generate geo-locating information on vessels of interest. The 
tracking loop process is as illustrated in Figure10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10-MDA tracking loop 
 
MDA, developed by the U.S., follows a layered defence model (see Figure 11) 
representing a screen formation in which all vessels are tracked with improved 
timelines as they approach the coast. Threats being asymmetric and uncertain, the 
aim of tracking is to account for each and every vessel in the surveillance domain or 
the area of interest. The U.S. MDIZ (maritime detection and identification zone) 
extends to 2000nm.50
 
 
                                                 
50 United States CG has incorporated mandatory 96 hour notice of arrival for foreign ships entering 
U.S. ports following the September 11 attacks. 2000 nm consideration is based on ships operating at 
average speed of 20 knots for 96 hours. 
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Figure 11-U.S. MDA  detection and indentification zone 51. 
 
 
 
MDA intelligence gathering activities also include HUMINT (intelligence from 
human agents or sources), ELINT (intelligence from electronic sources) and financial 
intelligence apart from inputs from various tracking networks like AIS and LRIT. 
The possible inputs to MDA compiled by this author are as surmised in Table 9.  
 
                                                 
51 Source: Watts, R. B. (2006). Implementing maritime domain awareness.  (Master’s thesis). Naval 
Postgraduate School. California: U.S. 
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Table 9-MDA input data 
 
 
 The tracking of ships is the primary component of any MDA. Considering the sheer 
volume of commercial traffic today and the contemporary threat environment posed 
by an elusive enemy in the form of asymmetric threats, it leaves a state with no 
choice other than to be critically aware and knowledgeable in terms of movements of 
shipping in near real time in its maritime domain. Presently the task of tracking 
merchant shipping is based on ship reporting systems (example AMVER, INDSAR 
and AUSREP for search and rescue efforts), automatic identification system (AIS)   
(initially adopted by IMO for vessel traffic management) and long range 
identification and tracking (LRIT).  
 
5.5.2  MDA tracking challenges  
The MDA concepts use AIS 52  and LRIT 53  inputs for vessel tracking and 
surveillance. The grey areas in tracking emanating from AIS and LRIT can impact 
                                                 
52 See Appendix 2   for information on AIS. 
53 See Appendix  2  for information on LRIT.  
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the MDA as wrong inputs lead to wrong assessment and thus wrong action. AIS data, 
as shown in Figure 12, are received by the shore monitoring station and integrated 
into the maritime domain awareness system. LRIT data is obtained either through 
International data exchange or national /regional data centre. 
 
 
Figure 12-AIS picture of Rotterdam 54(12:35 UTC, July12, 2010) 
 
 
AIS data can be classified into static, dynamic and voyage as reflected in Table 10 
(Mokhtari, Wall, Brooks & Wang, 2007). The problems with the AIS can be 
separately categorised under navigational and security domains. Navigation related 
problems include faulty static data; incorrect dynamic data and incorrect heading 
include faulty static data. The AIS requires certain static inputs and voyage related 
data for correct transmission of data; however, in some cases due to incorrect static 
data entry false data is transmitted (Norris, 2010). The incorrect dynamic data results 
when non compliant GPS units are set up on differing datum (other than WGS 84) 
                                                 
54 See Rotterdam AIS  live picture available at the World Wide Web: http://www.shipais.com 
/currentmap.php?map=Rotterdam#.  
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resulting in wayward positions and incorrect data. Non interface of ship’s heading 
indicator to digital interface can result in a mismatch between heading and course 
over ground leading to incorrect heading (Norris, 2010).  
 
Table 10-Data Exchanged by AIS 
 
 
 
Security related problems from AIS could arise from its non applicability to the small 
boats, open broadcasts, false data, non transmission and jamming. AIS are not 
mandatory for vessels under 300 GT and hence these vessels can move about the 
surveillance area undetected. Asymmetric threats from such small boats can pose a 
serious challenge to maritime security as these vessels could carry out Limburg and 
USS Cole type bombings undetected.  Further, AIS signals are broadcast openly and 
receivers are available off the shelf in commercial markets very cheaply. Thus it is 
not impossible for terrorists or insurgents or even pirates to mount selective attacks 
against high value vessels or those carrying potentially dangerous cargo (Kraska & 
Wilson, 2008).  
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Security threats can also emanate from deliberate false transmissions. The IMO55 and 
Lloyds MIU intelligence (Murphy, 2009) have recorded examples wherein AIS 
equipment fitted on vessels has been configured to transmit false data about the ship 
especially by ships in piracy prone areas hence one cannot rule out the use of  similar 
tactics  by terrorists or pirates to carryout their attacks. Furthermore, Nautical 
Institute56 reports of AIS data showed duplicate identity i.e. two ships transmitting 
the same identity.  
 
Another key issue is that AIS data transmits only when it is switched on hence if the 
terrorists or pirates switch off the system upon boarding then the data will not be 
transmitted thus causing problems for tracking and detection in the MDA. Finally, 
there are also reports of AIS frequency being shared among non maritime users like 
taxi drivers in some parts of U.S. (Murphy, 2009; Kraska, 2009). This can become a 
problem in the future, if the same lands in the hands of pirates or terrorists who can 
use it to jam or even hack into MDA networks.   
 
 As regards the LRIT, it is a satellite based restricted information distribution system 
which is compatible with INMARSAT –C, Mini –C and D+ terminal. LRIT 
equipment transmits a very restricted range of information (ship’s identity position, 
date and time of position) every six hours. Similar to AIS, LRIT has its own pros and 
cons. Apart from cost and infrastructure, there are issues such as sovereignty, sailing 
history, small boats and cyber threats (Verma, 2009). In the LRIT system, states can 
request information from any data centre; however, in absence of any binding 
agreement or Convention, states may refuse such information citing sovereignty 
issues. Also, the LRIT system does not generate reports that include a ship’s previous 
sailing history. This can be a serious obstacle for carrying out security risk 
assessment and selective targeting based on such assessments. Further, as in the case 
                                                 
55 International Maritime Organisation (2010, April 28). AIS discrepancy reports (January to March 
2010) MSC 6/ Circ 6. 
56 The Nautical Institute. AIS forums. Available at http://www.nautinst.org/ais/reportedProbs.htm 
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of AIS, LRIT also does not address ships below 300 GT and it is also vulnerable to 
hacking. Thus threats from small boats and hackers could continue to pose 
challenges to the LRIT system. 
 
5.5.3 MDA and asymmetric threats  
Sun Tzu (2005) in his famous Art of War underlined the need to be aware of one’s 
enemies when he remarked:  
Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories. 
MDA is the strategy of being aware because it is about being forewarned, which is as 
good as being forearmed. Asymmetric challenges in the maritime domain arising 
from multitudes of ships, luxury crafts and fishing vessels crisscrossing oceans are an 
onerous task. Law enforcement agencies cannot patrol all the vastness of oceans in 
pursuit of elusive forces of darkness. It is, therefore, tools like MDA which act as 
force multipliers helping in risk assessment and selective targeting and also ushering 
in a feeling of security through the knowledge of one’s surroundings. Security, 
whether on land or offshore, comes with costs. However, considering the destruction 
and annihilation a terrorist bomb can cause, these costs have to be borne.  
 
MDA is not all about surveillance alone since even though surveillance provides 
useful information, it is not possible, without firm intelligence to know which ship or 
craft could pose a significant threat. MV Nisha57  and MV Yinhe58 are cases in point 
                                                 
57  See MV Nisha incident on the high seas. Retrieved July 13, 2010 from World Wide Web 
http://www.specialboatservice.co.uk/raid-on-mv-nisha.php. The ship was boarded by U.K. SBS 
assault teams, acting on tip off   that the ship may be carrying 'terrorist material' along with its stated 
cargo of sugar and based on inputs that the freighter's route from Mauritius was preceded by a stop at 
Djibouti, close to suspected Al-Qaeda havens of Somalia and Yemen. Post initial sweep of the vessel 
it was brought into port, where customs and anti-terrorism officers were able to perform an inch by 
inch search of the freighter. Nothing suspicious was found.  
58 Tyler, P.E (1993, September 06). No chemical arms aboard china ship. New York Times. Retrieved 
August 06, 2010 from the World Wide Web http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/06/world/no-chemical-
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wherein false information has led to undue interference. MDA is also not bereft of its 
share of problems. Apart from those arising from AIS and LRIT as brought out in 
this chapter, MDA faces the challenge of interoperability  between law enforcement 
agencies and commercial setup, data interface from multiple sources and regulation 
of data transfer both  nationally and internationally. The European SafeSeaNet, a 
domain awareness programme, faces challenges from illegal traffic. According to an 
EU surveillance report 59   70% of black picture constitute illegal traffic in the 
European seas. Small boats which remain outside the purview of the MDA will 
continue to pose challenges as asymmetric threats unless they are brought under 
MDA.  Nonetheless MDA is an initiative to reduce risks to maritime assets, a 
possible deterrence to perpetrators as they become aware that they are being watched 
and, more importantly, it takes away the surprise element from a possible 
asymmetric attack thereby giving  law enforcement agencies time to react. 
 
5.5.4 Maritime domain awareness and navigational freedoms  
Maritime domain awareness is a beneficial tool in law enforcement as it provides a 
real time picture of a nation’s surrounding waters.  MDA‘s purport can also be 
misused by states to excessively restrict passage rights enjoyed by foreign vessels 
based on security threats. Different nations have differing security perceptions thus it 
is quite possible that some states may consider the use of sonar, ballast water 
                                                                                                                                          
arms-aboard-china-ship.html. Yinhe a Chinese freighter was suspected by U.S to carry chemical 
weapon materials however after boarding by joint U.S. and Saudi officials nothing was found. China 
demanded apology from the U.S. however U.S. did not tender the same on grounds that it had acted in 
good faith. 
59 Wise Pen Team (2010). Maritime Surveillance in support of common security and defense policy of 
European Union. Retrieved August 07, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=902. The report mentions occurrence of two 
types of pictures through AIS and radar in the MDA  viz white and black. The white signifies 
validated plots and black signifies data not responding to electronic interrogation which may also 
include legitimate and illegitimate traffic.  
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exchange, the presence of ships near marine mammals, the mere transport of 
radioactive waste, transits by crude oil tankers, activities by naval oceanographic and 
survey ships as threats to their security and environment (Kraska, 2009). Thus, MDA 
could be used to deter or impede ships engaged in these activities which as per 
UNCLOS are lawful activities in the oceans. Some coastal nations have shown a 
willingness to misuse   technical, legal, and policy advances in maritime governance 
such as marine spatial planning, as opportunities to enforce unilateral excessive 
maritime boundary claims and illegal claims of sovereignty or jurisdiction over the 
oceans, or impose unlawful restrictions on the rights and freedoms of navigation. The 
dangers posed by maritime domain awareness are particularly acute because it serves 
as a targeting mechanism for coastal states to assert their claims over foreign-flag 
vessels located offshore and, thus, upsets the careful balance between coastal state 
rights and the passage rights of foreign flag vessels (Kraska, 2009). Tracking systems 
like SJÖBASIS developed by the Swedish Coast Guard, which gets real time data 
from surface radars of Swedish Armed Forces, as well as AIS and vessel monitoring 
systems, has software inbuilt into the system which can highlight ships deviating 
from their planned track or slowing down for some activity (Swedish Coast Guard, 
2010). This kind of surveillance which helps in zeroing in on suspicious activity, at 
the same time can also unduly interfere with ships innocent or transit passage.  
 
5.6  Supply chain security initiatives60  
Security incidents against international supply chains are threats to international 
trade and the economic growth of trading nations. International supply chains are 
highly dynamic and consist of many entities and business partners. The interplay of 
transport, logistics and supply chain has led to an era of multi level and multi layered 
security arrangements (Bichou, Bell & Evans, 2007). The dynamism of the elusive 
threat from the unknown has invented many security models of risk assessment, as 
the security incidents that take place are not accidental; they are intentional and 
                                                 
60 The supply chain initiatives are discussed in Appendix 3. 
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perpetrated for maximum damage. Thus past events may be a poor guide for the 
future.  They can only reinforce the statement that the threat to security is a clear and 
present danger (Bichou, Bell & Evans, 2007). The potential risk for containers and 
other conveyances of trade to be used as intercontinental delivery systems for 
weapons of mass destruction is real (Addario, 2007). With World projections for 
container cargo poised to surpass 200 million TEUs by mid 2011 (UNCTAD, 2009), 
the scanning of each container at every entry point is not only unfeasible but also 
uneconomical as it will result in delay and port congestion, severely affecting trade. 
Random X Ray scanning of containers does not provide satisfactory solution against 
the possible insertion of terror devices. Due to different elements (see Figure 13) 
involved in a supply chain, the vulnerability is based on the weakest link. The U.S 
initiated CSI and CT-PAT programmes with an aim to reduce the vulnerability in the 
supply chain. The World Customs Organisation also introduced SAFE programme 
for the same purpose.  
 
 
Figure 13 -Elements of supply chain.61
                                                 
61  Source: National Board of Trade (2008, January).Supply chain security initiative: a trade 
facilitation perspective. Retrieved July 08, 2010 from the World Wide Web 
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English/Trade%20facilitation/Report%20Supply%
20Chain%20Security%20Initiatives.pdf 
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5.6.1 Supply chain security and asymmetric threats  
Threats to supply chain security are very dynamic and elusive due to the involvement 
of multiple elements in the chain sequence. Initiatives such as SAFE, ISO 28000, 
CT-PAT and CSI (see appendix 3), though based on the precautionary principle of 
control of cargo, can definitely reduce the vulnerability of the supply chain by 
improving the access control mechanism; improving container security and storage 
area access; and prohibiting tampering and smuggling of devices or explosives. 
Effective surveillance through X-ray screening, RFID technology, motion detectors 
and CCTV networks can provide effective deterrence against asymmetric attacks. 
Implementation of ISO standards can bring in uniformity in implementation of 
important international conventions all over the world and thus help in harmonising 
as well as integrating universal responses against asymmetric threats. Further, all 
attacks against maritime targets emanate from land be they piracy or terrorism. 
Hence, if security and surveillance on land are tightened, one can significantly lower 
the threat vulnerability of maritime assets offshore. 
 
5.7 UN Security Council resolutions 
 In addition to the above maritime and supply chain security initiatives; states have 
been mandated to launch various other security related initiatives affecting the 
maritime domain by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Notable among those are the 
UNSCR 1540, 1874 and 1897.  
 
 
 
75
  
5.7.1  UNSCR 154062 (WMD Proliferation) 
UNSCR 1540 allocates three primary obligations to all states relating to such items: 
1.  to prohibit support to non-State actors seeking such items;  
2. to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items 
to non-State actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing such proliferation;  
3. and to take and enforce effective measures to control these items, in order to 
prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and services 
that contribute to proliferation. (UNSCR 1540, 2004) 
 
5.7.2 UNSCR 1874(DPR Korea)63 
This resolution, adopted on 12 June 2009, bans all arms transfers from the DPRK 
and transfer of all arms except small arms or light weapons to the DPRK. This ban 
also includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missile-related technology. 
Resolution 1874 requires all states to inspect, in accordance with their national legal 
authorities and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK in 
their territory, including seaports and airports, with the consent of the flag state,  
provided the coastal or port  state has information that the cargo is prohibited by 
UNSC Resolutions. The resolution does not authorize the use of force if the 
inspection is refused.  However, the requesting state is required to report the matter 
to the Security Council. If a suspect ship is on the high seas, U.N. member states are 
required to request the right to board and inspect. If refused, the resolution obligates 
                                                 
62 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) . The UN Security Council adopted UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004, thus establishing for the first time binding 
obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce 
effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials 
available at http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N04 /328 /43/PDF/N0432843.pdf  
?OpenElement 
63See information on United Nations Security Council Resolution. UNSCR 1874 (2009) available at 
World Wide Web http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC /GEN/N09/368/ 49/PDF/ N0936849. pdf 
? OpenElement  
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the flag state to direct its vessel to port for inspection. The resolution authorizes 
states to seize banned items and prohibits “bunkering services” such as refuelling or 
servicing of a ship with suspected cargo.  
 
5.7.3 UNSCR 1897 (Somali piracy)64  
Resolution 1897 (2009) adopted on 30 November 2009 requires all States, and in  
particular flag, port, and coastal states, states of the nationality of victims and 
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other states with relevant jurisdiction 
under international law and national legislation, to cooperate, in the fight against 
piracy, determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of persons 
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, consistent 
with applicable international law including international human rights law. It also 
requires all states, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are 
subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, 
providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their 
jurisdiction and control, such as victims and witnesses and persons detained as a 
result of operations conducted under UN Security Council resolution 1897. 
 
5.7.4 Implications of UNSCR 
 These resolutions, in order to take effect, are required to be adopted into the state’s 
domestic laws for effective implementation.  Though obligations exist for states but, 
in absence of penalties or sanctions, such obligations may not be complied with 
especially by rogue states.  The adoption and its implementation by states often 
stems from the legitimacy of the resolution (Boese, 2005).  PSI has not been 
accepted as a norm creating initiative by all states and the interdiction principle 
promulgated by UNSCR1540 stems from it (Song, 2007).  Some writers like Talmon 
                                                 
64 See information on  United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1897 (2009) available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement 
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(2009) claim that UNSCR acting under chapter VII of U.N. charter has in fact 
replaced the conventional law making process at the international level.  If this is 
true, then it is definitely a paradigm shift in the international law making process. 
According to Article 25 of U.N. Charter all member states are obligated to accept 
and carry out decisions of UN Security Council. However, in practice these 
resolutions can only work if they are binding and there are some penalties attached, 
failing which these resolutions remain just paper action. 
 
5.8  Conclusion 
Initiatives and surveillance mechanisms have their own fair share of legal and system 
generated drawbacks as pointed out in this chapter. Notwithstanding the same, the 
fact that these mechanisms are in place as precautionary and preventative measures 
to address maritime threats is in itself an effective deterrent to perpetrators.  
However, whether these are adequate or inadequate can be gauged, sad but true, only 
after an occurrence of an incident. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
6.1  Freedom of navigation 
The freedom of navigation doctrine advocates the principle of non interference and 
exclusive flag state control across ocean spaces beyond the coastal state jurisdiction. 
Over the years, the concept of freedom of the seas and hence the freedom of 
navigation has faced a lot of challenges owing to the dictates of time and state 
practice.  However, the concept continued to remain in vogue even though it 
underwent transformation both in the area of applicability and in the way it was 
applied. UNCLOS, which came years later, has also upheld this principle wherein the 
High Seas have been promulgated as open to all states for lawful use. The 
navigational freedoms enjoyed by foreign flag ships have also been protected in EEZ 
and Territorial Waters through the exercise of High Seas freedom and innocent 
passage respectively provided they are not detrimental to the sovereignty and 
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security of the concerned coastal states. That is to say, navigational freedoms cannot 
be practiced at the behest of risks to life and destruction of the property of other 
people or states.  
 
UNCLOS rightly balances the coastal state interests and the flag state rights to ensure 
the freedom of navigation in every zone. By promulgating the need for domestic 
laws to be in consonance with the international law, UNCLOS goes a step further in 
its attempt to bring in uniformity in state practice so as to preserve the freedom of 
navigation in every maritime zone. UNCLOS, considered as the constitution of the 
ocean, is hugely silent on maritime terrorism and according to Efthimios Mitropoulos 
(2006), Secretary General of the IMO, the legal framework that regulates freedom of 
seas can only be effective if it is flexible enough to stand the dictates of time and face 
new challenges. UNCLOS (1982) derives this flexibility through addition of words 
“[m]atters not regulated  ... [t]o be governed under rules and principles of general 
international law” to its preamble. This gives UNCLOS the dynamism to survive the 
test of time and take on new challenges. Post 9/11 asymmetric threats have become a 
lurking danger in the maritime domain. Countering them and balancing navigational 
freedoms will be a challenge that will be posed to UNCLOS in the event of a 9/11 
type attack in the maritime domain. 
 
6.2  Asymmetric threats and challenges 
The growth of international trade and shipping fleets year on year brings increased 
threat vulnerabilities.65 Asymmetric threats in the maritime domain, statistically, do 
not have the requisite numbers to signify a growing threat when compared to those in 
the terrestrial environment.  However, to ignore the threat based on statistics would 
be foolhardy. The past decade has witnessed a growth in piracy as never before 
spreading its vicious tentacles as far as 1000 nm from shore. However, there has 
                                                 
65More ships means more inspection load on law enforcement agencies and the security infrastructure 
which can lead to the possibility of compromise or laxity or both  somewhere down the line. 
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been no significant maritime terror attack since Superferry 14, this despite the fact 
that maritime targets especially containers are very vulnerable to sabotage and 
clandestine activities. The proliferation of knowledge of seamanship and ship 
handling cannot be downplayed as there are a few terror networks today that have 
potential maritime capability. The mutually beneficial link up of terror networks and 
insurgent groups with pirates, as is suspected in the case of Somalia, together with 
proliferation of WMD can be a formidable threat in the maritime domain in the days 
to come; if unchecked, it will have a deleterious effect on international shipping.  
 
6.3 Hypothetical scenarios 
In order to analyse the impacts of security initiatives on navigational freedoms as a 
result of state(s) reaction to terror attacks, it is essential to generate hypothetical 
scenarios and use war gaming methods. The aim of this asymmetric wargaming66 is 
to discuss the behaviour of the affected state or states and international community 
with regard to navigational freedoms following an asymmetric terror attack, or in the 
event of availability of credible intelligence indicating the strong possibility of such 
an attack. Past reactions to security incidents by concerned states, also give valuable 
indications to their future actions. However, the response of a terror affected state or 
states to a particular terror incident apart from other factors will also largely depend 
on the scale and nature of the attack.   
 
Let us look at some of the various maritime terror scenarios that could happen based 
on perpetrators’ intent and capability. In the event of proliferation of the CBRN 
technology, the perpetrators could use a container vessel to act as a Trojan horse to 
carry a CBRN device located in one of the few thousand containers and detonate it in 
the vicinity of a major port like Los Angeles or Long Beach or Rotterdam. 
                                                 
66 Wargaming is a visualisation process of action, response, and counter response of own force’s 
course-of-action (COA) in relation to an enemy's course of action and response. Source 
:http://www.infantryglossary.com/W.htm 
 
 
81
  
Perpetrators could also target Cruise vessels like the Oasis of the Seas (Oasis class67 
of cruise vessels) which is symbolic of luxury or elitism. The vessel which can carry 
about 6000 passengers would be a prime target. Perpetrators could ram the vessel at 
high seas using an explosive laden small boat or a subsurface craft launched from a 
mother vessel (logistic support vessel) to cause mass genocide.  Encouraged by the 
huge publicity of the BP incident in the Gulf of Mexico, perpetrators could target 
offshore oil rigs either by hijacking a ship and using the ship as a missile or by 
ramming the platforms using suicide crafts or small boats to cause environmental 
disaster. Perpetrators could also deploy mines or even launch a missile attack against 
a ULCC or VLCC in the Suez Canal or Strait of Hormuz or other major oil choke 
points to cause severe disruption in oil trade and also cause environmental damage. 
 
6.4  Asymmetric threats and creeping jurisdiction    
 The above mentioned incidents are likely to generate differing counter responses 
from various states based on the impact, enforcement capability and national or 
political will. Undoubtedly a WMD terror incident is likely to generate much more 
reaction and drastic measures than the offshore bombing of a VLCC or ULCC tanker 
as the causalities and mayhem from such an attack would be phenomenal.  
 
 
                                                 
67Oasis of the seas and Allure of the seas belong to Oasis class of cruise vessels.  
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Figure 14-Spectrum of risk amplification. 
 
The diagram in Figure 14 depicts policy decisions based on the intensity and 
attenuation of risk issues clearly suggesting the half way house as the optimum 
principle for ideal policy decisions. A study carried out by a Carnegie Mellon team68 
has revealed that people respond to terror attacks with anger and are more likely to 
support aggressive anti terror policies than mere precautionary ones (T.S. Thomas, 
2002) and hence the risk amplification (Leiss, 2003)69 of the impending threat may 
force states to take certain retaliatory measures which may even lead to a war like 
scenario. The international community may also respond with drastic measures to 
show solidarity with the affected state or states through IMO or Security Council 
Resolutions.  These may be short term as well as long term measures to deter such 
attacks in the future. The following could be some of the possible ways to counter 
maritime threats: 
                                                 
68 See Carnegie Mellon Study reveals impact of fear, anger on American perception of terrorism 
available at World Wide Web  http://www.cmu.edu/cmnews/ 020510/020510_terrorism.html 
69 The social amplification of risk framework is based on the metaphor of amplification: signals are 
received, interpreted, amplified, and passed on by different social actors. The media belong to the 
most important "stations" of amplification by selecting and framing risk messages and transmitting 
them to the public. The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) is not only considered the most 
comprehensive overall framework extant for the study of risk but also as a policy tool in the public 
domain arising out of risk issues. Media portrayal, public sensitivity and nature of hazard greatly 
influence societal response which in turn forces policy decisions. 
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6.4.1 IMO initiatives 
A  WMD incident in all likelihood could force many maritime states to re-visit the 
recently  in force SUA Protocol of 2005 and adopt it in the same way as was done in 
the case of 1988 SUA  Convention70 following the 9/11 incident. This action in large 
measure would pave the way for international acceptance of interdiction principles of 
PSI. Attacks against cruise vessels and VLCCs by small boats would strengthen the 
case for making mandatory71  the applicability of ISPS and LRIT to non SOLAS 
vessels including leisure craft and traditional fishing boats thus affecting the 
navigational freedom currently enjoyed by them. IMO could take additional steps to 
legislate non-consensual boarding of vessels in peacetime to interdict terrorists and 
WMD. In particular, it could focus on expanding the authority granted to ship 
masters under ISPS to permit them to consent to any search of their vessels for anti 
terrorists’ measures (Hodgekinson et al, 2007). It may also not be surprising if IMO 
contemplates a PSI type maritime Convention to strengthen maritime security 
initiatives against WMD proliferation duly incorporating the PSI boarding clauses. 
Such a Convention would definitely tilt the balance against navigational freedoms. 
 
6.4.2 Regional and bilateral initiatives 
 Any WMD attack on U.S. or EU states will add impetus to U.S. led CT-PAT and 
CSI programmes wherein it would be very likely that the concerned state would not 
allow vessels in its territory from states that are not party to CSI and CT-PAT type 
programmes (Argomaniz, 2010) or may even consider diverting these vessels to a 
secluded zone for closer inspection, which may result in undue delay.  Bilaterally, 
the PSI programme of the U.S. will also get the much needed attention with the 
tendency of the U.S. to enter into boarding agreements with willing flag states.  
                                                 
70 IMO urged member nations to become parties to 1988 SUA Convention following the 9/11 and as a 
result about 142 states had become parties to the Convention by 2006.  
71 International Maritime Organisation (2006). ISPS Code and non SOLAS vessels. 
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Further, it is very much likely that following a WMD attack signifying a certain 
technology proliferation in the hands of terrorists, interdiction and boarding of ships 
suspected to be involved in WMD transfer at sea would be considered as legal and 
consistent with UNSCR 1540 and thus increased PSI related interdiction and 
boarding, even in contiguous zone of participating states, may eventually lead to its 
overall acceptance in international law. 
 
6.4.3   Unilateral actions  
Coastal states enforce maritime security laws based on their assumed threat 
perceptions and interpretation of actions required under international law. The 
immediate reaction of any state under attack from terror will be to impose security 
level 3 in accordance with the ISPS Code which may entail closure of port (s) to all 
commercial activities. Often, as a fallout of a terrorist incident, law enforcement 
efforts lead to increased boarding and inspections of ships on the pretext of self 
defence and establishment of security zones which ultimately leads to restrictions to 
navigational freedoms. Influential states 72  may also impose certain security 
preconditions like mandatory presence and round the clock patrolling by armed 
guards, security surcharge in ports and installation of additional advanced security 
devices for ships entering or transiting their territory which may restrict navigational 
freedoms of ships. Further, customary international law under the UN Charter allows 
self-defence measures, high seas interdiction and preventive and retaliatory actions 
when threat is imminent (Thomas, 2009). These actions can be initiated by any state 
invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
 
                                                 
72 Daly E (2002, November 27). After oil spill, Spain and France impose strict tanker inspections. 
New York Times, A5. Following Prestige incident France and Spain issued notifications which 
imposed at sea inspections clauses on single-hulled oil tankers more than 15 years old including 
banning unseaworthy ships passing through their EEZs. 
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Thus a state will be justified under Caroline73 criteria (Crawford, 2002) to interdict a 
vessel destined for a port where it intends to release a deadly biochemical agent or 
has the intention to ram the port with explosives (Guilfoyle, 2007). Security concerns 
can force states to review international customary laws. A case in point being the MV 
San incident wherein  a North Korean vessel MV San was boarded and searched for 
nuclear material by the Indian Coast Guard  in August 2009 within Indian territorial 
waters under UN Security Council resolution 1874 74 . The action of the Indian 
maritime law enforcement agency was considered by the international community to 
be in consonance with the UNSCR though as per UNCLOS the ship did have the 
right of innocent passage. This departure from customary law due to a UN Security 
Council resolution clarifies that the customary practice of freedom of navigation can 
be sacrificed to ensure peace and security. Further, ICJ (1992) in the Lockerbie 
incident 75  has also upheld that obligations that arise from the Security Council 
Resolution take precedence over international treaties; hence, it goes without saying 
that UNSCR under Chapter VII is a binding obligation for all UN member states. 
Thus nations may look to UNSCR for authorising interdictions under Chapter VII to 
address the problems of non consenting states. These authorisations will bear impact 
on the free movement of ships throughout the ocean.  
 
Further creeping of jurisdiction is another measure resorted to by states based on 
security concerns which have a direct impact on navigational freedoms.  Suppose an 
oil platform is attacked; the concerned coastal state, as a preventive measure may 
depart from UNCLOS which authorises only a 500 m safety zone around offshore 
                                                 
73 Caroline criteria refers to incident that  dates back to 1837 when British armed forces entered U.S. 
territory and destroyed a vessel owned by American citizen which was engaged in aiding insurgency 
in  Canada and justified the action as self defence.  
74 Refer to  para   5.7.2   for the resolution. 
75 International Court of Justice  Reports (1992). Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK), Order of 14 
April 1992. 
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installation and increase it  to an extant based on its threat perceptions. India, for 
example is actively considering a no vessel zone up to 5 nm around offshore 
installations owing to the Mumbai attacks and persistent threats from LeT to blow up 
these installations (India’s Government, 2009). These no vessel zones, when 
enforced, can significantly reduce the available navigable water area within the 
Indian EEZ thus impacting the passage rights enjoyed by foreign flag vessels within 
the zone. 
 
6.4.4   Security, freedom of navigation and creeping jurisdiction 
After having examined some of the various options and possibilities available to both 
the affected state(s) and international community based on hypothetical scenarios, let 
us look to draw conclusions through state practice by analysing some of the incidents 
that took place in the past wherein interdiction / boarding occurred without 
permission from flag states based on threat perceptions. 
 
In 1871, Mary Lowell an American merchant vessel was captured off the Bahamas 
with a cargo of arms meant for Cuban rebels fighting a war against Spain. The U.S 
and Spain presented their case to a mixed commission and the U.S. case was rejected 
on the grounds that the U.S. had negligently allowed the ship to fall into wrong hands 
thus depriving it of its flag state rights. Spain’s case was upheld as self-defence 
though the act occurred at high seas (Moore, as cited in Zwanenberg, 1961). In 1873 
Virginius a U.S. merchant vessel was captured on the high seas by the Spanish Navy 
whilst engaged in the shipment of arms for Cuban insurgents. Spain defended its 
action as self- defence, a claim which was accepted by Britain but was rejected by 
the U.S (Moore, as cited in Zwanenberg, 1961). 
 
In recent times also states have resorted to interdiction for maintenance of peace, 
security and self-defence.  During the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S asserted its right 
to stop and search vessels bound for Cuba.  America justified its action as regional 
peace keeping and the same was not contested by the Soviet Union (Dyke, 2005).  
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Also on 08 October 1997, the UNSC adopted a resolution authorising Economic 
Community of West African States to stop and inspect vessels entering Sierra Leone 
to enforce an embargo on importation of petroleum products and arms (Soons, 2001).  
Israeli defence forces seized an Iraqi76 flagged ship in the Red Sea about 300 nm 
from Israel with about 50 tons of arms meant for Palestinians. Israel defended its 
action as self- defence and was largely supported by the U.S (Horowitz, 2002; 
Whittaker, 2002).  Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S commenced its 
interdiction and boarding of vessels in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Strait of 
Hormuz in search of Osama Bin Laden (DIILS, 2003 as cited in Dyke 2005). It also 
issued notification to the maritime industry that ships suspected of carrying Osama or 
his staff would be forcefully boarded. The U.S justified its acts as those arising out of 
self-defence. Environmental security arising out of transport of ultra hazardous cargo 
has also forced states to act contrary to UNCLOS as was seen in the case of Pacific 
Pintail a British nuclear cargo vessel which was forced out of Chilean EEZ by 
Chilean Forces in 1995 citing safety issues. Thereafter, Chile modified its Law for 
nuclear safety to require prior authorisation for any transport of nuclear or 
radioactive substances through its EEZ, which is a classic example of creeping 
jurisdiction (DIILS, 2002 as cited in Dyke, 2002). 
 
6.5  State practice, opinio juris and customary law 
The interdiction cases above highlight the fact that states have used the right of self 
defence to deviate from customary law practice and exercise extra territorial 
jurisdiction. The right of self defence is mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter 
wherein under an exceptional circumstance a state can have the right of individual or 
collective self defence. Currently, the issue of whether these interdictions at high 
seas can be labelled as against principles of UNCLOS has some writers up in arms 
claiming that the UNCLOS principles are valid only for peaceful use of oceans 
                                                 
76 Lloyd’s list showed documents to the effect showing the legal owner as Iraqi however Israel 
claimed that the vessel was owned by Palestinians. 
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(Churchill & Lowe, 1999; Dalton, 1988). Thus, vessels with terrorist motives cannot 
claim navigational freedoms under UNCLOS.  In a nut shell, one can adduce from 
the foregoing that coastal states have exercised greater control over oceans whenever 
there has been a threat to their safety and security and these measures undoubtedly 
are likely to continue in the future. 
 
A highly publicized WMD attack could increase the acceptance of arrangements 
such as PSI as a feature of international law and lead to wider state practice of high 
seas interdiction including, possibly,  of ships from non consenting states (through 
UNSCR authorisation).  It is argued that the widespread practice of PSI could 
conceivably bring in a new rule of high seas interdiction based on state practice. This 
possibility cannot be ruled out since customary law, it is generally believed, finds its 
source from state practice and opinio juris, hence if enough states act (state practice)  
in a particular manner out of a sense of legal obligation(opinion juris) for a particular 
time then a new rule of customary law is created(Churchill & Lowe, 1999;  Baker, 
2010). ICJ judgement in the North Sea Continental Shelf77 case (as cited in Churchill 
& Lowe, 1999) adjudicates this process of creation of customary law. The same was 
also evident in the emergence of Continental Shelf as a legal concept (Churchill & 
Lowe, 1999). Thus if the boarding agreements of PSI reach a significant number and, 
based on this, there is consistent practice of high seas interdiction, it may develop 
into customary law even before it is accepted through a Convention as was in the 
case of EEZ(Churchill & Lowe, 1999 p.161; ICJ Rep 13(as cited in Churchill & 
Lowe, 1999)).78  
                                                 
77ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case ICJ Rep.1 (1969) decided that only a widespread and 
representative participation in the Convention might suffice of itself to transform the purely 
conventional rule into a customary one. Thus a treaty provision if adopted by sufficient number of 
states, satisfying widespread and representative participation clause, can change the provision to a 
customary rule. 
78ICJ Rep.13 Libya /Malta Continental Shelf Case (1985). The ICJ said that it is incontestable that 
…the EEZ…is shown by the practice of states to have become part of customary law even before the 
Convention had entered into force. 
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6.6  Concluding thoughts 
The analysis of various asymmetric threats and their consequences indicates that a 
WMD attack would be catastrophic, and based on the societal risk amplification, 
especially from the developed world, the states may be forced to act tough which 
may of course include implementing the interdiction principles of PSI and possible 
enforcement of extra territorial jurisdiction based on threat perceptions. Maritime 
security initiatives and domain awareness tools are indeed force multipliers for law 
enforcement agencies to deal with asymmetric threats.  However, at the same time, 
the possible misuse of some of the initiatives like boarding provisions in SUA 
Protocols of 2005 and PSI for furthering the coastal state practice of creeping 
jurisdiction over ocean spaces cannot be ignored.  This can be gleaned from the fact 
that PSI accords contiguous zone (CZ) the same status as that of internal waters and 
territorial sea with regard to boarding rights, whereas, the UNCLOS considers  
CZ as part of the EEZ/high seas with respect to navigational rights. Thus in the event 
of PSI attaining a customary law status the coastal states may extend their territorial 
sea rights in CZ, which would impact the navigational freedom currently enjoyed by 
ships in these waters.  
 
It is thus ironic to note that states that advocate of freedom of navigation are also 
pressing for PSI, which could strengthen the phenomenon of creeping jurisdiction 
practiced by some states. The need to curtail the practice of extra territorial 
jurisdiction has resulted in certain safeguards, like the consensual boarding clause, 
which undoubtedly can also be exploited by naughty states or non-state actors for 
their advantage through denial of permission to board. States may also face 
opposition from conservatives as WMD or terror related interdictions at high seas are 
not prescribed in UNCLOS and hence are considered as violations of freedom of 
navigation principles.  
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Technological advancement79 can help reduce interdictions at sea but involves huge 
installation, operating and maintenance costs which may not be affordable to the 
economically poor states. Also complete reliance on technology will not be devoid of 
risks as no technology is completely tamperproof and terrorists do have capabilities 
to hack computers and networks and exploit them to their advantage. 
 
Further, the growing numbers of bilateral boarding agreements, entered into between 
states which allow high seas interdiction to deter terrorists and WMD proliferation 
outside the purview of the UNCLOS, gives indications of a possible shift in ideology 
and emergence of new customary norms in the area of maritime security through 
state practice (Thomas, 2009).  Writers like Stuart Kaye (2007) have argued for 
changes in the flag state regime based on the view that unless that regime is 
challenged, the development of international law will always be sectional and 
reactive. 
 
 Judge Jesus (2003) of ITLOS has remarked that: 
 
One should not be so resistant to change certain aspects of legal regimes, if 
such change is of paramount importance to fight new forms of and 
approaches to criminal activity at sea that affect all states otherwise, we 
might all become victims but at the same time passive promoters of piratical 
and terrorist crime waves that may engulf the shipping activity in many areas 
of the world oceans. (p.38) 
 
To conclude, one can say that the flag state regime is a deeply valued traditional 
norm which is difficult to change.  However, when in the face of threats as grave as 
WMD, it will not be difficult to conceive the development of a new customary right 
                                                 
79 Employment of electronic scanning of ships through satellites, incorporation of smart chips into 
containers, biometric identification and RFID technology in all ports and onboard ships to prevent 
sabotage. 
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to interdict ships, outside the law of the sea based on state practice, and thus if the 
number of states asserting a right to deal with security measures continues to grow in 
the context of asymmetric threats, especially WMD related, then navigational 
freedoms may be challenged and may also begin to erode with creeping jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92
  
 
 
 
References 
 
Addario, F. D. (2007).  Managing supply chain security through quality standards: A 
case study to implement ISO 28000 in a global coffee house. In K. 
Bichou, Michael G. Bell & A. Evans (Eds.), Lloyd’s practical 
shipping guides risk management in port operations, logistic and 
supply chain security. London: Informa maritime and transport.  
 
Agoes, E. R. (2000).  The law of the sea and navigation: The Indonesian archipelagic 
state perspective. In D.R. Rothwell & S. Bateman (Eds.), 
Navigational rights and freedoms and the new law of the sea (pp. 144-
153). Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Anand, R. P. (1973).  Tyranny of freedom of seas doctrine. International Studies. 12, 
416-429. 
 
Anand, R. P. (1983). Origin and development of the law of the sea. The Hague: 
Martin  Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Anand, R. P. (2002).  Non European sources of the law of the sea. In P. Ehlers, E. 
Mann –Borgese and R. Wolfrum (Eds.), Marine Issues (pp.19-35). 
London: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Applegate, M. (2001).  Preparing for asymmetry: as seen through the lens of joint 
vision 2020. Carlisle: Carlisle Strategic Studies Institute. 
 
Argomaniz, J. (2010).  The European Union counter terror policy response: an 
overview. Retrieved July 22, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas140.pdf 
 
Baker, R. R. (2010).  Customary international law in the 21st century: old challenges 
  and new debates. European Journal of International Law, 21, 73-204. 
 
Banlaoi, R. C. (2005).  Maritime terrorist in Southeast Asia: the Abu Sayyaf threat. 
 Naval  War College Review. 58, 62-81. 
 
 
 
93
  
 Baslar, K. (1998). The concept of the common heritage of mankind in international 
law. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer law international.   
 
Bass, G. F. (Ed.) (1972).  A history of seafaring based on underwater archaeology. 
New York: Walker &Co. 
 
Bazan, B. A. (2007).  Freedom of navigation: an outdated concept. Retrieved July 05, 
2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.iflos.org 
/media/8890/blanco-bazan%20lecture.pdf 
 
Beckman, R. (2005).  Legal implications of proliferation security initiative. In Joshua 
Ho & C. Z. Raymond (Eds.), The best of times, the worst of times: 
Maritime security in the Asia –Pacific (pp.215-227). Singapore: 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. 
 
Beckman, R. C. (2009).  The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol: tools 
to combat piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism. In 
R.H.Burns, S .Bateman and P. Lehr (Eds.), Lloyds MIU handbook of 
maritime security (pp.187-200). Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
 
Bichou, K., Bell, M. G. H., Evans, A. (2007).  Port and supply chain security, risk 
and reliability. In K. Bichou, Michael G. Bell & A. Evans (Eds.), 
Lloyd’s practical shipping guides risk management in port operations, 
logistic and supply chain security. London: Informa maritime and 
transport.  
 
Blanck, S. J. (2003).  Rethinking asymmetric threats. Carlisle: Carlisle Strategic 
Studies Institute. 
 
Block, R. (2006, February 23).  Security gaps already plague ports: Proposed DP 
world deal shines light on problem that continues to be vexing. Wall 
Street Journal, A12. 
 
Boese, W. (2005). Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Arms 
Control association. Retrieved July 21, 2010 from the World Wide 
Web: http://legacy.armscontrol.org/events /20050315_1540   
 
Bolton, J. (2004, September 7).  All out war on proliferation. Financial Times. 
Retrieved July 09, 2010 from the World Wide Web:http://merln.ndu. 
edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/36035.pdf  
 
BP Deepwater Horizon incident in Gulf of Mexico. (n.d.).  Retrieved July 21, 2010 
from the World Wide Web:http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Deepwater 
_Horizon_oil_spill  
 
 
 
94
  
Buffalo, D. L. (2006).  Defining asymmetric warfare. Land warfare papers, (no. 58). 
Virginia: Institute of land warfare U.S Army. 
 
Burns, R. H. (2009).  Tankers, specialized production vessels and offshore terminals: 
vulnerability and security in the international maritime oil sector. In 
Rupert Herbert Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (Eds.),  Lloyds 
MIU handbook of maritime security (pp.133-157). London: CRC 
Press 
 
Butler, G., & Maccoby, S.  (2003). The development of international law. London: 
Longman Green & Co. 
 
Byers, M. (2004). Policing the high seas: the proliferation security initiative. AJIL, 
98, 526-545. 
 
Cairns, W. R. (2005). AIS and Long range identification and tracking. The Journal of 
Navigation,58, 181-189. 
 
Calvo, A. (2010, August 10). M stands for mystery. Pan Orient News. Retrieved 
from the World Wide Web http://www.panorientnews.com/en/ news. 
php ?k=284 
 
Carafano, J. J. (2007). Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from 
the Sea.  Backgrounder.  Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation.  
 
Chai, L. S. (2007). The revision of the SUA Convention.: a brief look ahead by a 
maritime lawyer. In Maximo Q. Mejia Jr and Jingjing Xu (Eds.), 
Coastal zone piracy and other unlawful activities at sea (pp.39-50). 
Malmö: World Maritime University. 
 
Chalk, P. (2009).  Threat to container ships, cruise lines and passenger ferries. In 
Rupert Herbert Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (Eds.), Lloyds 
MIU handbook of maritime security (pp.117-132). London: CRC 
Press. 
 
Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved Jul 08, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 
 
Chawla, P. (2004, September, 04). ISPS Code: is the world safer. ITIC forum. 
Retrieved July 03, 2010 from World Wide Web: http://www.itic- 
forum.com/ presentations/04_09_LON _Code.pdf  
 
Chayes, A. (1963). Law and quarantine of Cuba. Forein Affairs. 41, 550-557. 
 
 
 
95
  
Christopher, H. (2010). The terror threat from Somalia: internationalisation of Al- 
Shabaab. Critical threat project of American enterprise institute. 
Retrieved August 03, 2010 from World Wide Web: critical threats 
http://www..org/sites/default/files/pdfpload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Thr
eat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf  
 
Chronology of LTTE suicide bomb attacks. (n.d.). Society for peace, unity and 
human rights for Sri Lanka. Retrieved June 29, 2010 from World 
Wide Web: http://www.spur.asn.au/chronology_ of_suicide_bomb 
_attacks _by_ Tamil_Tigers _in_sri_Lanka.htm 
 
Churchil, R. R., & Lowe, A. V. (1999). The law of the sea (3rd edn). Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Clancy, T. (1994).  Debt of honor. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 
 
Clancy, T. (1996).  Executive decision. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 
 
Coll, S. (2008, December 1). Lashkar E Taiyyaba. New Yorker. Retrieved June 29, 
2010 from World Wide Web: http://www.newyorker.com/online/ 
blogs/ stevecoll/2008/12/lashkaretaiba.html
 
Coyle III, P.E., & Samson, V. (2009, January). The proliferation security initiative: 
background, history and prospects for the future. International 
Commission on Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament. 
Retrieved July 10, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.icnnd.org/ research /Proliferation Security_ Initiative. pdf 
 
Crawford, J. (2002). The international law commission’s articles on state 
responsibility: introduction, texts and commentaries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Cronin, K. A., Aden, H., Frost, A., & Jones, B. (2004, February 06). Foreign terrorist 
organisation. CRS report for Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2010 from 
Congressional Research Service reports Web site: http://www.fas.org 
/irp/crs /RL32223 .pdf  
 
Dalton, H. (1988). Comments on national security concerns. In J.M.Van Dyke,  L. 
Alexander & J.R. Morgan. (Eds.), International Navigation: rocks 
and shoals ahead? (pp.373-375). Hawaii: The Law of the Sea 
institute. 
 
Dean, A. H. (1958). Freedom of the seas. Foreign Affairs, 37(1), 83-94. 
 
 
 
96
  
Decision Support Systems Inc. (2001, December 31). Hunting the sleeper: tracking 
Al Qaeda’s covert operatives. Retrieved June 20, 2010 from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.metatempo.com/huntingthesleepers.pdf  
 
Djalal, H. (2009). Remarks on the concept of freedom of navigation.  In M. H. 
Nordquist, T. J .H. Koh, J. Moore, (Eds.), Freedom of seas, passage 
rights and the 1982 law of the sea convention. (pp.65-76) 
Netherlands:  Kluwer Law International. 
 
Dyke, J. M. (2002). The legal regime governing sea transport of ultra hazardous 
radioactive materials. Ocean Development and International Law 
Journal, 33, 77-108 
 
Dyke, J. M. (2005). The disappearing right to navigational freedom in the exclusive 
economic zone. Marine Policy 29, 107-121. 
 
Eye on the UN.  (2010). U.N. has no definition of terrorism. Retrieved June 17, 2010 
from World Wide Web:http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1 &p 
=61  
 
Fayle, C. E. (1933/2006). A short history of the world’s shipping industry. Oxon: 
Routledge. (Original work published in 1933). 
 
Fulton ,T. W. (1911). The sovereignty of seas. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons. 
 
Gold, E. (1981). Maritime transport: the evolution of international marine policy and 
shipping law. Toronto: D.C Heath and Company. 
 
Gompert, D. C., Gordon IV, J., Grissom, A., Frelinger, D. R., Jones, S. G., Libicki, 
M C.,…… Hunter, R. E. (2008). War by other means: building 
complete and balanced capabilities for counter insurgency. Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation. 
 
Gordon, M. (Ed.). (1999). Origins of Second World War reconsidered. London: 
Routledge Publishers.  
 
Greenberg, M., Chalk, P., Khilko. I, Ortiz, D.S., & Willis, H. H. (2006). Maritime 
terrorism: risk and liability. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
 
Group of 77. (n.d.). Retrieved June 06, 2010 from the World Wide Web http:// www: 
g77.org/doc. 
 
Guilfoyle, D. (2007). Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction. Journal 
of Conflict and security law, 12, 1-36 
 
 
 
97
  
Guy, N. (2005). The coastal state and its EEZ, navigational and hydrographical 
responsibilities, Hydro International, 9. Retrieved  June 09, 2010 
from World Wide Web :http://www.hydro-international.com/ issues 
/articles/id454-The_Coastal_State_and_Its_EEZ.html 
   
Hansen, H. T. (2009). Distinctions in the finer shades of grey: the four circles model 
for maritime security assessment. In Rupert Herbert Burns, Sam 
Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds).  Lloyds MIU handbook of maritime 
security (pp.73-83). London: CRC Press. 
 
Hanson, S. (2010, July 28 ). Al-Shabaab. Backgrounders. Retrieved August 03, 2010 
from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org / 
publication /18650/ al shabaab.html   
 
Heyman, N. M. (1997). The World War 1. Westport, CT: Green Wood Press. 
  
Hodgekinson, S. L., Cook, E., Fichter, T.,…..Gregory, N. P.(2007). Challenges to 
maritime interception operations in the war of terror: Bridging the 
gap. American University International Law Review, 22, 583-671. 
 
Hoffman, F. G. (2009). Hybrid threats: reconceptualising the evolving character of 
modern conflicts. Strategic Forum, 240, 1. 
 
Horowitz, D. (2002, January 05). Israel says 50 tons of seized arms were meant for 
Palestianians. Irish Times, p13. 
 
India’s government to secure oil and gas installations. (2009, November 19). Oil and 
gas news. Retrieved  July 22, 2010 from the World Wide Web: http:// 
www.oil-gas-subsea.com/home/534-indias-govt-to-secure-offshore-
oil-and-gas-installations.html  
 
Infantry glossary. (n.d.). Wargaming. Retrieved from the World Wide Web:http:// 
www.infantryglossary.com/W.htm 
 
International Court of Justice reports. (1992). Questions of interpretation and 
application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial 
incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK), Order of 14 April 1992. 
Retrieved  from ICJ Web Site ww.icj-cij.org/ docket /files/ 88/ 10253 
.pdf ?PHPSESSID=579b954199bd4e0ff45549ecd7bbea1c 
 
International Energy Agency. (2009). World energy outlook 2009. Retrieved June 15, 
2010 from World Wide Web:http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 
docs/weo2009/WEO2009_es_english.pdf  
 
 
 
98
  
International Institute of Counter Terrorism. (2009, November 22). Maritime 
terrorism in the eyes of Al Qaeda. Retrieved June 28, 2010 from the 
World Wide Web http://www.__ict.org.il /Portals /0/Internet%20 
Monitoring %20Group/JWMG _Maritime _Terrorism .pdf  
 
International Maritime Bureau. (2010). Piracy and armed robbery against ships 
annual report 01 January-31 December 2009. Essex: ICC 
International Maritime Bureau. 
 
International Maritime Organisation. (1998). Overview of shipping and navigation. 
World maritime day background document. Retrieved June 01 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData 
only.asp/data_id%3D21794/Overviewofshippingandnavigationhistory
.pdf  
 
(2001, November 20). Review of measures and procedures to prevent 
acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews 
and the safety of ships. (Resolution A.924(22)). London: Author. 
 
(2003, October 23). Report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 
eighty-seventh session, Leg 87/17 para 108. London: Author  
 
(2004, May 18). Report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 
eighty-eighth session, Agenda Item 13. London: Author  
 
(2006). ISPS Code and non SOLAS vessels. Retrieved July 22, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://www. imo.org/safety/ 
mainframe.asp?topic_id=1470 
 
(2010, April 28). AIS discrepancy reports (January to March 2010) 
(MSC.6/Circ. 6). London: Author  
  
(2010, July 31). Status of conventions. Retrieved August 04, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http: // www. imo .org / conventions / 
mainframe.asp?topic_id=247  
 
International Standard Organisation. (2007, September 15). ISO 28000 Specification 
for security management system for supply chain. Retrieved July 10, 
2010 from the World Wide Web:http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink / 
fetch/- ISO_28000_2007 % 28 E % 29.pdf 
 
Jesus, J. L. (2003). Protection of foreign ships against piracy and terrorism at sea: 
legal aspects. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
18 363-400. 
 
 
 
99
  
Kaye, S. (2007). Threats from global commons: problems of jurisdiction and 
enforcement. University of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 241. Retrieved 30 July, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007394 
 
Koh, T. B. (1982, December 06). A constitution for the oceans. Speech given at the 
final session of the 1982 Law of the Sea Conference at Montego Bay. 
Retrieved August 01, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_englis
h.pdf 
 
Kopella, S. (2009, April). The territorialisation of the exclusive economic zone: 
implications for maritime jurisdiction. Paper presented at the 
international boundary research unit. Twentieth anniversary 
Conference 2009.  The state of sovereignty, Durham University. U.K. 
 
Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2008). Fighting pirates: the pen and the sword. World 
Policy Journal, 25, 41-52. 
 
Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). Off course: the dark side of tracking all shipping? 
Pirates can do it too. Armed Forces Journal. Retrieved July 12, 2010 
from the World Wide Web:http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4228257  
 
Kraska, J. (2009). The dark side of maritime awareness. Proceedings. U.S. Naval 
Institute. Retrieved July 25, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/story.asp 
 
Kumar, B. V. (2007). Oceans and the regulatory framework: A techno-legal 
perspective. Retrieved June 06, 2010 from the World Wide Web http: 
//drs.nio.org/drs/bitstream/2264/780/2/Refresher_Course_Mar_Geol_
Geophys_2007_Lecture_Notes_14.pdf  
  
Kwiatkowska, B. (1989). The 200 mile exclusive economic zone in the new law of 
the sea. Dordrecht: Martin Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Lehr, P. (2009). Maritime terrorism: locations, actors and capabilities. In Rupert 
Herbert Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (Eds.), Lloyds MIU 
handbook of maritime security (pp.55-71). London: CRC Press. 
 
Leiss, W. (2003).  Searching for the public policy relevance of the risk amplification 
framework. In N. Pidgeon, R. E. Kasperson & P. Slovic (Eds.), the 
social amplification of risk factors (pp.355-373). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
100
  
Mazaheri, A. (2008). How the ISPS Code affects the port and port activities. 
(Master’s thesis), Högskolan I Borås, Borås, Sweden. 
 
Mbiah, K. (2007). SUA 2005 and coastal zone piracy. In Maximo Q. Mejia Jr & 
Jingjing Xu (Eds.), Coastal zone piracy and other unlawful activities 
at sea ( pp.177-187). Malmö: World Maritime University. 
 
Mcdowell, C. E., & Gibbs, H. M. (1954/1999). Ocean transportation. Washington 
D.C.: Beard Books. (Original work published in 1954) 
 
Mejia, M. Q., & Mukherjee, P. K. (2006). The SUA Convention 2005: a critical 
evaluation of its effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts. 
The Journal of International Maritime Law, 12 170-191. 
 
Mendez, G. (2009, April 16). Al-Shabab: an examination of Somali piracy and its 
links to terrorism. Central Asia Online. Retrieved June 30, 2010 from 
the World Wide Web: http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/ 
xhtml/ enGB/features/caii/features /2009/04/16/feature-03  
 
Merari, A. (1993). Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. Terrorism and Political 
Violence. 5 (4), 213-251. 
 
Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. (11eds)(2003) Springfield MA: Merriam 
Webster.  
 
Metz, S., & Johnson II, D. V. (2001). Asymmetry and U.S. military strategy: 
definition, background, and strategic concepts. Carlisle, PA:  Strategic 
Studies Institute. 
 
Mitropoulos, E. (2006, April 24). Speech given at vessel tracking and identification 
conference 2006, London. Retrieved 30 July 2010 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_ 
id=1322&doc_id=6278   
 
Mokhtari, A. H., Wall, A., Brooks, P., &Wang, J. (2007). Automatic identification 
system: data reliability and human error implications. The Journal of 
Navigation, 60, 373-389. 
 
Moller, B. (2009). Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. DIIS report  2009-
02. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies.  
 
Moore, J. B. (1898). International arbitration, Vol III Washington: Government Print 
Office. 
 
 
 
101
  
Moore, J. B.  (1906). Digest of international law Vol II. Washington: Government 
Print Office. 
 
Mukherjee, P. K. (2002). Maritime Legislation. Malmo: World Maritime University 
publication. 
 
Murphy, M. N. (2009). Lifeline or pipedream? origins, purposes and benefits of 
automatic identification system, long range identification and tracking 
and maritime domain awareness. In  R.H.Burns, S .Bateman and P. 
Lehr (Eds.) Lloyds MIU handbook of maritime security(pp.13-28). 
Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
 
MV Nisha incident on the high seas. (n.d.). Special Boat Service. Retrieved July 13, 
2010 from the World Wide Web:http://www.specialboatservice.co. uk 
/raid-on-mv-nisha.php   
 
Norris, A. (2007). AIS implementation: success or failure. The Journal of 
Navigation, 60, 1-10. 
 
O’Meara, M. R. (2007). Maritime piracy in 21st century: a short course for U.S. 
policy makers. Journal of Global change and Governance, 1, 46-55. 
 
Oasis of the seas. (n.d.). Royal Caribbean International. Retrieved 21 June 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.royalcaribbean.com 
/findacruise / ships/class/ship/home.do?shipCode=OA 
 
Oxman, B. H. (2006). The territorial temptation: a siren song at sea. American 
Journal of International Law, 100, 830-851. 
 
Paul, T. V. (1994). Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Parfomak, P. W. & Frittelli, J. (2007). Maritime security: Potential terrorist attacks 
and protection priorities. Washington DC: Congressional Research 
Service  
 
Prosser, A. & Scoville, H. (2004, June 16). The proliferation security initiative in 
perspective. Centre for Defence Information. Retrieved July 08, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf  
 
Raymond, C. Z. (2007). The threat of maritime terrorism in Malacca straits. 
Terrorism Monitor. 4, (3) Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved June 29, 
2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.jamestown.org/ 
programs/gta/archivesgta/2010/?tx_publicationsttnews_pi2%5Bissue
%5D=19  
 
 
102
  
 
Raymond, C. Z. & Morrien, A. (2009). Security in the maritime domain and its 
evolution since 9/11. In  R.H.Burns, S .Bateman and P. Lehr (Eds.) 
Lloyds MIU handbook of maritime security(pp.187-200):Boca Raton: 
CRC Press. 
 
Richardson, M. (2006a).  Maritime related terrorism. Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah what 
next? Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies. 
 
Richardson, M. (2006b). The proliferation security initiative: an assessment of its 
strengths and weaknesses with some proposals for shaping its future. 
Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 3. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.  
 
Roach, A. (2003). Container and port security: a bilateral perspective. The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 18, 341-361. 
 
Roman, E. L. (2009). Summary report on global maritime domain awareness 
conference: 2nd Western hemisphere MDA workshop (3-5 Dec 2008). 
Retrieved July 10, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=108647&coll=limited  
 
Ross, S., & David, J. S. (2009). Somali Piracy: An escalating security dilemma. 
Harvard Africa Policy Journal, 5, 55-70. 
 
Rubin, M. (2007, May 31). Asymmetrical threat concept and its reflections on 
international security. Presentation to the strategic research and study 
centre (SAREM) under Turkish General Staff. Retrieved Jun 10, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http:// www.aei.org/ docLib /20070502_ 
Asymmetrical Threat Concept.pdf  
 
Schafer, L. (1997, August 01). The Canon Shot Rule. Legal Aspects of 
Contemporary Marine Fisheries. Retrieved June 04, 2010 from http:// 
cdserver2.ru.ac.za/cd/011120_1/Aqua/Marine%20fisheries/CHAP2/C
ANON.HTM 
 
Sharmarke, O. A. A. (2009, October 28). Speech given at the Chatham House 
London. Retrieved June 28, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15071_281009sharmarke.pdf  
 
Sinking of SS Athenia. (n.d.). Retrieved June 05, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.uboataces.com/battle-athenia.shtml  
 
Sinking of HMS Royal Oak. (n.d.). Retrieved June 05, 2010 from the World Wide 
Web: http://www.uboataces.com/battle-scapa-flow6.shtml   
 
 
103
  
 
Song, Y. H. (2007). The U.S. led proliferation security initiative and UNCLOS: 
legality, implementation and an assessment. Ocean development and 
International Law, 38, 101-145. 
 
Soons, A. H. A. (2001). Enforcing the economic embargo at sea. In V.Gowlland-
Debbas, M. G. Rubio & H. H. Saharoui (Eds). United Nations 
sanctions and international law. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Sorenson, K. (2008). State Failure on the High Seas: Reviewing the Somali piracy 
(FOI Somalia Papers report 3).  Stockholm:  Swedish Defence 
Research Agency. 
 
Spadi, F. (2006). Bolstering the proliferation security initiative at sea. A comparative 
analysis of ship boarding as a bilateral and multilateral implementing 
mechanism. Nordic Journal of International Law, 75,249-278. 
 
Stearns, P. N., & Langer. W. L.  (2001). The encyclopaedia of world history. New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 
 
Stepanova, E.  (2008). Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: ideological and structural 
aspects. (SIPRI research report # 23). Stockholm: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Stevens, W. O., & Westcott, A. (1944). A history of sea power. New York: Doran 
and Co. 
 
Swedish Coast Guard. (2010). Maritime Surveillance: coordinated civil maritime 
surveillance and maritime information. Karlskrona, Sweden: Author 
 
Swedish National board of trade. (2008, January). Supply chain security initiative: a 
trade facilitation perspective. Retrieved July 08, 2010 from the World 
WideWeb:http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English
/Trade%20facilitation/Report%20Supply%20Chain%20Security%20 
initiatives.pdf 
 
Talmon, S. (2009). Security Council treaty action. Revue Hellénique de Droit 
International, 62, 65-116. 
 
Terrorist financing. (2008, February 29). OECD financial action task force report. 
Retrieved June 30, 2010 from the World Wide Web:http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf  
 
 
 
104
  
Terrorists in Mumbai attack arrive by boat. (2008, November 27). IBI News. 
Retrieved June18, 2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www .ibi 
news.com/ibinews/newsdesk/20081027134010ibinews.html  
 
The LTTE in brief. (n.d.). The Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva. Retrieved June 29, 2010 from the World Wide 
Web: http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf  
 
The Nautical Institute. (2010, July). AIS forums-reported problems. Retrieved July 
12, 2010 from the World Wide Web:http://www.nautinst.org/ais/ 
reported Probs.htm  
 
Thomas, T. C. (2009).  The proliferation security initiative: towards relegation of 
navigational freedoms in UNCLOS? An Indian perspective. Chinese 
Journal of International Law, 8, 657-680. 
 
Thomas, T. S. (2002, May 10). Study reveals impact of fear, anger on American 
perception of terrorism.  Carnegie Mellon News. Retrieved August 01, 
2010 from World Wide Web: http://www.cmu. edu/ cmnews /205 10 
/020510_terrorism.html   
 
 Tyler, P. E. (1993, September 06). No chemical arms aboard china ship. New York 
Times. Retrieved August 06, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/06/world/no-chemical-arms-
aboard-china-ship.html.  
 
Tzu, Sun. (2005).  The Art of War. (Lionel Giles, Trans). El Paso, Texas: El Paso 
Norte Press. 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (1982). The Law of the Sea: 
official text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
with annexes and index: final act of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: introductory material on the 
convention and the conference (UNCLOS). London: Croom Helm. 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2009). Review of maritime 
transport. Retrieved July 08, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2009_en.pdf 
 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. (n.d.). Retrieved 
July 12, 2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.uncjin.org/ 
Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_ 2/convention_eng. 
pdf 
 
 
 
105
  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). The globalization of crime: A  
transnational organized crime threat assessment. Retrieved June 19, 
2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.unodc.org/ documents/ 
data-and analysis/tocta / TOCTA _Report_ 2010_ low _res. pdf  
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. (2004). Retrieved July 13, 2010. 
from the World Wide Web: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874. (2009). Retrieved July 13,2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement  
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1897. (2009). Retrieved July 13, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N09/624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement 
 
United Nations Treaty series 14758. (1952, August 18). Santiago Declaration by 
Peru, Ecuador and Chile and later by Costa Rica. Retrieved June 06, 
2010 from the World Wide Web:http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/ 
28/18/00054896.pdf  
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2007, October 02). Fact Sheet. Retrieved July 
10, 2010 from the World Wide Web:http://www.cbp.gov/ link handler 
/cgov/trade/cargo security/ csi/csi_ fact_ sheet. doc 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2007, December 13). CT-PAT overview. 
Retrieved July 10, 2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www 
.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_over 
view.xml.). 
 
U.S. Department of Defense. (2007, September 11). Irregular warfare, a U.S. Joint 
operations concept. Retrieved June 15, 2010 from the World Wide 
Web:http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Proliferation Security Initiative. Retrieved July 07, 
2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.State.gov/t/isn/c10390. 
htm   
 
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Status of PSI membership. Retrieved August 06, 
2010 from the World Wide Web: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs /ps/ 
2010 /06/ 142823 .htm 
 
 
 
 
 
106
  
U.S. Coast Guard. (2007, December). National concept of operations for maritime 
domain awareness. Retrieved July 11, 2010 from the World Wide 
Web:http://policy.defense.gov/hdasa/references/refdocs/UNCLAS% 
20 MDA%20CONOPS%20 Final %20 071213.pdf  
 
U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security: Global maritime intelligence plan 
(2005). Retrieved July 11, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/ offdocs/nspd/gmii-plan.pdf   
 
Valencia, M. J. & Akimoto, K. (2006). Guidelines for navigation and overflight in 
the exclusive economic zone. Marine Policy, 30, 704-711. 
  
Verma, B. K. (2009). Long range identification and tracking. Journal of National 
Maritime Foundation of India,5, 39-56. 
 
Vitzthum, V. G. (2002). From the  Rhodian sea law to UNCLOS III. In P.Ehlers, E, 
Mann –Borgese and R. Wolfrum (Eds.), Marine Issues, 1-17, London: 
Kluwer Law International. 
 
Watts, R. B. (2006). Implementing maritime domain awareness. (Master’s thesis). 
Naval Postgraduate School. California: U.S. 
 
Wendel, P. (2007). State responsibilities for interferences with the freedom of 
navigation in public international law. Hamburg:Springer 
 
White House News Release. (1945 September 28). Text of President Harry Truman‘s 
proclamation. Retrieved June 05, 2010 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450928a.html  
 
Whittaker, B. (2002). Voyage of arms ship. Guardian. Retrieved August 06, 2010 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2002/jan/14/israel  
 
Wilford, J. N. (2010, February 21).  On Crete, new evidence of very ancient 
mariners. New York Times. Retrieved June 01, 2010 from the World 
Wide Web:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/science/16archeo 
html?_r= 1  
 
Wise Pen Team. (2010). Maritime surveillance in support of common security and 
defense policy of European Union. Retrieved August 07, 2010 from 
the World Wide Web: www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/download 
file.aspx? fileid=902  
 
 
 
107
  
World Trade Press. (n.d.). What is CTPAT. Retrieved July 10, 2010 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.world trade ref.com /WTR:_site/C-
TPAT_main.asp  
 
Young, C. (2009, June). The 2005 SUA Protocol: new offences and boarding 
provisions. Paper presented at Workshop for ASEAN member states 
on developing an integrated approach to maritime security through the 
counter terrorism convention, criminal and international law: Legal 
perspectives and capacity building. Singapore. 
 
 Zemanek, K. (1999). Was Hugo Grotius really in favour of the freedom of the Seas?  
Journal of the History of International Law,1, 48-60. 
 
 Zwanenberg, A. (1961). Interference with ships on the high sea. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 10, 785-817. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108
  
Appendix 1 
Asymmetric warfare- Definitions 
 
1. Definitions 
1.1   Asymmetric warfare is not something new to the history of warfare. The 
concept, as a technique, has been employed by armies since centuries and even dates 
back to the Greek era when the Greek army used Phalanx against enemy (Buffalo, 
2006). The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s following maxim outlines the key 
strategy of an asymmetric attack giving essence to the fact that the theory is not a 
modern invention80
 
[Y]ou can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places 
 which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only 
 hold positions that cannot be attacked. (Sun Tzu, 2005) 
 
1.2 There were many attempts by various writers to define asymmetric warfare. 
Political analyst T.V. Paul defines asymmetric warfare in his book titled 
“Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers,” as  
  
Conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic 
 power resources. (Paul, 1994, p.20) 
 
1.3  This definition however was silent on threats from non state actors. The U.S 
specific publicized working definition defines asymmetric approaches  
 
 [a]re attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US 
weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States 
expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a 
                                                 
80  Sun Tzu. The Art of War( Translated by Lionel Giles) (El Paso, Texas: El Paso Norte Press,2005)
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major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an 
opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require 
an appreciation of opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often 
employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can 
be applied at all levels of warfare -- strategic, operational, and tactical -- and 
across the spectrum of military operations. (Steven Metz and Douglas V. 
Johnson II, 2001)81
 
1.4  Definition which is general in nature and quoted by many military journals is 
the one given below by Steven Metz82 (2001).  
 
In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, 
organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize 
one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the 
initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, 
military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail 
different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or 
some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be 
deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with 
symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical 
dimensions.  
 
 
                                                 
81  Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, 
Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 5-6. 
 
82 Ibid. 
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Appendix 2 
AIS and LRIT 
 
2.1 Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
IMO adopted a new regulation 19 and revised Chapter V of the Safety of life and 
property at sea (SOLAS 74 as amended) Convention to incorporate AIS. The 
Convention required all ships over 300 gross tonnages or that carried 12 or more 
passenger on international voyages, to install AIS. The system was initially adopted 
by IMO as a safety tool for collision avoidance however is now being investigated as 
a tool for maritime security (Cairns, 2005)83.  
 
2.1.1  Working and technicalities  
AIS operate on VHF radio frequency and hence can detect other equipped targets in 
and around bends, behind hills and also in restricted visibility conditions thus giving 
a distinct advantage over radar. AIS exchanges data regarding navigational and 
voyage related information of ships with other AIS enabled ship and shore stations. 
The dynamic data is required to be transmitted at rates up to once every two seconds 
and static information is only transmitted once every six minutes. The signals are 
broadcast automatically and continuously without human intervention. AIS has two 
class systems. Class ‘A’ for SOLAS vessels and class ‘B’ for non SOLAS and leisure 
craft. 
 
2.2 Long Range Identification and Tracking 
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its 81st session in May 2006 adopted new 
regulations for the LRIT together with associated performance standards and 
                                                 
83William R. Cairns, “AIS and Long range identification and tracking.” The Journal of Navigation 58 
(2005):181-189. 
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functional requirements (IMO, 2006)84 . The LRIT has been included in SOLAS 
chapter V on Safety of Navigation making it mandatory for ships 300 gross tonnage 
and upwards on international voyages viz: passenger ships, including high-speed 
craft; cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units. The ships are required to 
transmit their identity, location and date and time of the position. The LRIT data is 
independent of AIS and there can be no connectivity between the two systems. LRIT 
differs from AIS on many issues apart from enhanced range, AIS is an open 
broadcast system which can be received by anyone using AIS receiver, however data 
derived through LRIT is available only to the recipients who are entitled to receive 
such information. The safeguards concerning the confidentiality of LRIT data have 
been built into the regulatory provisions. LRIT is thus a closed system. Following are 
entitled to LRIT data provided they are contracting parties to SOLAS: 
1. Flag state at all times;  
2. Port state in respect of a ship that is at sea, irrespective of where it is, 
that has indicated its intention to enter a port facility in that state or a place 
under the jurisdiction of that state;  
 3. Coastal state in respect of a ship at sea, other than within the territorial 
waters of its flag state that is within 1,000 nm of its coast (even if the ship does 
intend to enter a port in that state). 
 
2.2.1  Mechanics of LRIT  
LRIT is satellite based restricted information distribution system. LRIT is compatible 
with Inmarsat –C, Mini –C and D+ terminal. LRIT equipment transmits a very 
restricted range of information (ship’s identity position, date and time of position) 
every six hours. This frequency of transmission can be increased based on security 
incident to every 15 minutes using Inmarsat SOLAS equipment or upto every 02 
minutes with Inmarsat non SOLAS equipment. LRIT is a point to point signal and is 
                                                 
84 International Maritime Organisation (IMO). “Long range identification and tracking (LRIT)” 
http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=905. (accessed July 15, 2010). 
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secure from all but state sponsored interception. The signals from ships are not 
encrypted but transmitted in random packets as per the standard Inmarsat protocol. 
 
2.2.2  LRIT Data flow85  
The LRIT system requires states to set up a National Data Centres that would release 
data to International Data Exchange (IDE) on a strictly regulated basis. Countries 
which move into a regional or cooperative arrangements based on cost saving 
techniques would have RDC (Regional Data Centre) or CDC (Cooperative Data 
Centre) (Murphy, 2009). The aim is for IDC to facilitate web based data flows 
among these centres. The data flow or the diagrammatic representation of LRIT 
architecture is shown in the figure. 
 
Fig A1. LRIT System Architecture86. 
 
                                                 
85 Martin N. Murphy, “Lifeline or pipedream? Origins, purposes and benefits of automatic 
identification system, long range identification and tracking and maritime domain awareness” in the 
Lloyds MIU handbook of maritime security, eds. R.H.Burns, S .Bateman and P. Lehr (Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, 2009), 13-28. 
86International Maritime Organisation (IMO). “ Long range identification and tracking (LRIT)” 
http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=905. (accessed July 15,2010). 
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The flag states have the choice to decide to which NDC, RDC, CDC or IDC their 
flagged ships are to report. The ships are then required to report through a 
Communication Service Provider (CSP) to an Application Service Provider which in 
turn forwards the processed data to the concerned data centre as requested by the flag 
administration of the ships concerned (Murphy, 2009). 
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Appendix 3 
Supply chain security 
 
  
3.1 Supply chain security initiative 
 A lot of supply chain security initiative programs came about after 9/11 for example 
BASC in South America, EU’s Customs Security Programme and APEC Star of Asia 
Pacific. The main aim of the entire programme was to enhance security of supply 
chain at the same time reduce delays as a result of elaborate inspections. It is 
pertinent to mention that for ensuring continuance of freedom of navigation at sea, 
there is all the more need for elaborate security arrangements on land or port of 
departure which can ensure terror free and uninterrupted trade flows. In the following 
paragraphs a few of the International and U.S. initiatives on supply chain security 
initiatives are discussed to shed light on how these efforts reduce the vulnerability of 
the ports and ships from asymmetric threats. 
 
 
3.1.1 World Customs Organisation Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global 
trade (SAFE)87  
The WCO’s SAFE framework is one of the most ambitious initiatives for security in 
the supply chain, since it includes all member states in the WCO and is based on 
cooperation both between different customs authorities and between companies and 
customs authorities. The framework applies to all modes of transport. SAFE is 
intended to establish standards that create security in the supply chain in order to 
create confidence, predictability and enhance prospects of identifying high risk 
                                                 
87 Swedish National Board of Trade, Supply chain security initiative: a trade facilitation perspective.  
2008, January, http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English /Trade%20facilitation/ 
Report %20Supply%20Chain%20Security%20Initiatives.pdf.  
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consignments. SAFE is based on four core elements which are intended to permeate 
the work of improving security in the supply chain: 
1.  Advance electronic information: SAFE has been formulated in such 
a way that it harmonises the elements of data required in electronic advance 
information on imports, exports and transit shipments. 
2. Risk management: each country participating in SAFE undertakes to 
introduce a consistent risk management approach that addresses threats to 
security. 
3. Outbound inspection: in line with the importing country’s request 
and based on a comparable risk targeting method, the exporting country shall 
perform an outbound inspection of high risk containers and cargo, preferably 
with equipment that does not require the cargo to be physically opened, for 
example large-scale X-ray machines and radiation detectors. 
4 Business partnerships: SAFE defines benefits that customs 
authorities shall offer businesses that meet minimal supply chain security as 
well as standards and best practices. 
Thus SAFE ultimately simplifies international trade, secures supply chain and at the 
same time combats terrorism also. 
 
3.1.2 ISO 2800088 
This is an international standard specification for enhanced security management 
system for global supply chain. The principles of this standard is to facilitate better 
controls of flow of transport, to combat smuggling, to meet  threats of piracy and 
terrorism and thereby create a secure management of the international supply chain. 
IMO Maritime Safety Committee discussed the applicability of ISO 28000 in its 86th 
session and acknowledged it by according following comments: 
                                                 
88 International Standard Organisation,  ISO 28000 Specification for security management system for 
supply chain. September 15, 2007  http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/- ISO_28000_2007 
%28E%29.pdf.  
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[t]he ISO 28000 series were now published and numerous ports, terminals 
and organizations were being certified by third party independent accredited 
certification bodies; while recognizing that ISO standards could be applied to 
all ships, irrespective of size, type, purpose and whether operated 
internationally, domestically or within internal waters…… 
 
 This International Standard 89  is based on the methodology known as Plan-Do-
Check-Act (PDCA). PDCA can be described as follows. 
Plan: establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in 
accordance with the organization’s security policy. 
Do: implement the processes. 
Check: monitor and measure processes against security policy, objectives, 
targets, legal and other requirements, and report results. 
Act: take actions to continually improve performance of the security 
management system.   
ISO 28000 thus in a nut shell articulates a strategy for assessment of risk and 
determining countermeasures as a core component of providing physical security for 
the set up. 
 
3.1.3  Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 This is U.S. customs initiative brought about after the September 11 attacks. The 
initiative aims to increase the security of the containers, which are considered as 
Trojan horses, being shipped to U.S. from around the World. CSI90 uses a security 
regime to ensure all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified 
                                                 
89International Standard Organisation, supra note ibid. 
 
90 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet. October 2 2007, http://www.cbp.gov/ link handler 
/cgov/trade/cargo  security/ csi/csi_fact_sheet.doc. 
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and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the 
United Sates. The key core elements91 of CSI are as follows (Roach, 2003): 
1.   Identify high-risk containers.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that pose a potential risk 
for terrorism, based on advance information and strategic intelligence.  
2.    Pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped.  
Containers are screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at 
the port of departure. RFID tags are used for identification.  Use technologies 
to pre-screen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly 
without slowing down the movement of trade.  This technology includes 
large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices. 
3. Using smarter and tamper proof containers. Electronic sealing, 
motion or light detectors to enable tamper proof containers. 
 
In all more than 58 CSI ports are in operation throughout the world (U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, 2007).CSI participating ports have a distinct advantage in port 
business. The waiting time for movement of goods is fairly reduced due to reduced 
inspection in respect of goods loaded from CSI participating ports. So it is safe to 
conclude that CSI initiative can significantly improve a port’s business and also 
lower the vulnerability of container shipping from asymmetric attacks. 
 
3.1.3 CT-PAT  
CT-PAT 92  is a U.S. Customs and Border Protection programme launched as a 
voluntary government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that 
                                                 
91  Capt. Ashley Roach, “Container and port security: a bilateral perspective”. The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 18, (2003):341-361. 
92 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CT-PAT overview. December 13, 2007 http://www . cbp .gov / 
xp / cgov/trade/ cargo_security/ctpat/ what_ctpat /ctpat_overview.xml. (accessed 10 July ,2010) 
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strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security. 
C-TPAT recognizes that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can provide the 
highest level of cargo security only through close cooperation with the ultimate 
owners of the international supply chain such as importers, carriers, consolidators, 
licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers. Through this initiative, businesses are 
required to ensure the integrity of their security practices, communicate and verify 
the security guidelines of their business partners within the supply chain. By joining 
CTPAT, members are ensured of reduced CBP inspections resulting in reduced 
border delay times. CTPAT programme also incorporates assignment of a C-TPAT 
Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) to the company to validate and enhance 
security throughout the company’s international supply chain.  Importers are required 
to conduct a comprehensive assessment of their international supply chains based 
upon the established C-TPAT security criteria. An importer93  who outsources or 
contracts elements of his supply chain, such as a foreign facility, conveyance, 
domestic warehouse, or other elements, he must work with these business partners to 
ensure that pertinent security measures are in place and adhered to throughout their 
supply chain. CT-PAT thus aims to comprehensively secure the supply chain. 
                                                 
93 World Trade Press. What is CTPAT. http://www.world trade ref.com/WTR: _site/C-TPAT_ main. 
asp . (accessed July  10,2010). 
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